

The Echo of a Thought in Sight: Aspect-Seeing and Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy

by

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*for my father, who introduced me to philosophy;
and for my mother, who introduced me to books*

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS OF WITTGENSTEIN'S WORKS

BB	<i>Blue and Brown Books</i>
BT	<i>Big Typescript</i>
CV	<i>Culture and Value</i>
LC	<i>Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief</i>
LWPP I, II	<i>Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I and II</i>
OC	<i>On Certainty</i>
PG	<i>Philosophical Grammar</i>
PI	<i>Philosophical Investigations</i>
PO	<i>Philosophical Occasions</i>
PR	<i>Philosophical Remarks</i>
RPP I, II	<i>Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I and II</i>
TLP	<i>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</i>
Z	<i>Zettel</i>

Note on Endnotes and Footnotes: Endnotes are by section, and are marked by letters (a, b, c...). Footnotes are not by section, and are marked by Arabic numerals (1, 2, 3...).

Don't look for anything behind the phenomena; they themselves are the theory.

—Goethe, in Wittgenstein's *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I*

INTRODUCTION

In the preface to his *Philosophical Investigations*,¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein writes: “I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own”.² By any standard, he succeeded. Although Wittgenstein left only one published work, and one half-completed, the impact of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*² and the *PI* has been enormous. The *PI* in particular has inspired a still-growing number of interpretations, responses, theories, parodies—even a play by Tom Stoppard.³

Part of the allure of Wittgenstein’s work, and especially of the *PI*, is its difficulty.⁴ Wittgenstein’s work, even superficially, does not *look like* the work of a traditional philosopher: he writes in brief, enigmatic remarks and pronouncements; these are meticulously ordered and arranged,⁵ though often not in such a way that the principle behind this order is immediately apparent. Much has been published on the right way to read Wittgenstein, but predictably, there is still very little agreement on even what the basic interpretive approach to his texts should be. It is also true that Wittgenstein is, to this day, a polarizing figure: while there are some who find his texts rich and deeply rewarding, others find him—and his interpreters and followers—intellectually shallow, mystifying, even philosophically lazy. It might seem futile, foolish, or arrogant to add yet another contribution to the heterogeneous and divisive abundance of writings on Wittgenstein; however, I believe that there is still much to be gained from careful study of a philosopher whose writings and reception bear such a troubled relationship to philosophy.

¹ Hereafter, “*PI*”.

² Hereafter, “*TLP*”.

³ *Dogg’s Hamlet*.

⁴ This reputation is so extreme that even writers who do not explicitly speak of Wittgenstein’s work as being “notoriously difficult” (Morick vii) will make references to general misunderstanding of Wittgenstein, or Wittgenstein’s own concerns as to whether his work would be understood (e.g. Hanfling 1).

⁵ In the *TLP*, *PI*, and *OC*; in works not prepared for publication, the remarks have not been arranged by Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein's philosophy uniquely problematizes the discipline: in its challenge to philosophy as traditionally understood, we are offered the possibility of insight into our own practice.

0.1 *The Work of the Philosopher*

I will take as my central question the one which is at the heart of interpretive disagreement: what is Wittgenstein *doing* when he says that he is doing philosophy? For most philosophers, this isn't a difficult question to answer: they are undertaking a project in an established philosophical field (e.g. metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics) and arguing for or against a particular theory or thesis in that field (e.g. that the world is made of monads, that knowledge is justified true belief, that beauty is in the eye of the beholder). There are unspoken rules according to which philosophy proceeds: in writing a philosophical work, one is contributing to a tradition with a long history. Wittgenstein was always clear that he considered a great deal of this tradition to consist of nonsense;⁶ and in the *PI*, he said that philosophy should be entirely free of doctrines, theses, and theories.⁷ How is he, then, contributing to this tradition? There is a problem in interpreting Wittgenstein which does not strike us when we read the works of most other philosophers: how, in his view, should we practice philosophy, and what does it mean to do so?

Broadly speaking, there have been two ways interpreters have reacted to Wittgenstein's work. The first is to treat his work as traditional philosophy: to look for arguments, reconstruct them, evaluate them, and come to conclusions about Wittgenstein's views on topics from how language works to how we know the minds of others. The second is to emphasize, in different ways, Wittgenstein's insistence that he is not advancing any kind of theory, and is therefore not doing traditional philosophical work. These approaches are incompatible: a reader who

⁶ E.g. in the preface to the *TLP*, *PI* §119.

⁷ E.g. *PI* §109, §128.

understands the *PI* as, for example, expounding a behavioristic philosophy of psychology will reject interpretations which claim that the *PI* contains no theories whatsoever, and vice versa. Readers with such opposing views will have little to say to each other: because they so radically disagree about basic interpretive starting points, they will not even be able to collaborate in reading particular passages. But must an ordinary reader, philosopher or otherwise, choose between these positions, or even *know* that they exist, in order to understand and enjoy the *PI*?

Maybe it is possible to enjoy the book on its own, almost as a suggestive work of art; but enjoyment is not understanding. To *understand* the book, it is crucial to come to terms with Wittgenstein's unique way of doing philosophy. There is an urgency to this task which is not matched, for example, by similar interpretive projects in literary studies. Notoriously difficult literary works, such as Joyce's *Ulysses*, have inspired interpretations from a plethora of schools: Marxist, feminist, structuralist, poststructuralist, etc. However, these interpretations generally complement and enrich each other, because the text is viewed as a polysemic entity which supports and contains all of these interpretations without necessitating a definitive reading.

While I in fact believe, for various reasons that will become clear, that there can similarly be no *fully* definitive reading of the works of the later Wittgenstein, there is still a way of setting about the interpretive task which I believe is the correct one. *Not* reading the work in this way counts as *misunderstanding* Wittgenstein. Specifically, those who try to read Wittgenstein in the same way that they read traditional philosophers do his texts an injustice: everything that is unique and most valuable about his work becomes invisible, and the possibility of attaining the invaluable insights offered by later Wittgenstein vanishes.

Thus, in this thesis, I will develop and argue for a way of reading Wittgenstein which illuminates his distinct insights. While this project is related to that of readers who emphasize the

fact that Wittgenstein advances no theories, I will not, as some readers do, overemphasize this aspect of Wittgenstein's work, and thereby obscure what is there.

0.2 Wittgenstein's Texts

Wittgenstein published only one book in his lifetime: the *TLP* in 1921. What is usually considered to be his second book, the *PI*, was partially completed at the time of his death in 1951: the first 693 remarks, which used to be considered Part I of the *PI*, were arranged in a single typescript compiled around 1945.⁸ At the time of Wittgenstein's death, his literary executors found a typescript based on a manuscript (MS 144) which consisted of 372 unnumbered remarks, taken from a variety of manuscripts dated May 1946-May 1945.^a G.E.M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees decided that this typescript was most likely intended to be part of the *PI*, and included this typescript (TS 234) as Part II of the *PI*.⁹ In the most recent edition of the *PI*,⁹ these remarks were retitled *The Philosophy of Psychology: A Fragment* (PPF), to emphasize their fragmentary nature and focus on psychology, as well as the fact that they have not been sequenced and edited like the first part of the text. Many of these remarks have their textual origin in manuscripts which have been published as *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol I and II* (RPP I and II), and *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I and II* (LWPP I and II).

The remarks in the *RPP*, *LWPP*, and those in other collections including the *Blue and Brown Books* (BB), *Zettel* (Z), *Big Typescript* (BT), *Culture and Value* (CV), *On Certainty* (OC),¹⁰ *Philosophical Grammar* (PG), *Philosophical Remarks* (PR), and *Philosophical Occasions* (PO),

⁸ It is more accurate to say that this typescript contains no remarks drawn from manuscripts written after June 1945 (PI xxi).

⁹ *Philosophical Investigations*, Revised Fourth Edition, tr. Anscombe, Hacker, and Schulte, ed. Hacker and Schulte, Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.

¹⁰ *On Certainty*, like the first part of the *PI*, exists as an ordered, numbered manuscript, meaning that it occupies a special position among Wittgenstein's last writings.

are constituted by parts of Wittgenstein's vast quantity of notes, unfinished typescripts and manuscripts, and other unpublished writings left behind after his death, referred to as his *Nachlass*; these collections have therefore not been subjected to the same level of scrutiny as the *TLP* and first part of the *PI*. Writings considered part of the *Nachlass* date from all periods of Wittgenstein's life; sometimes, as in *CV*, the remarks collected in one book date from across a period of ten years or more. Wittgenstein constantly revisited the same philosophical ideas; thus, it is best not to regard any of the remarks from the *Nachlass* as expressing his definitive views. My interpretive stance will allow us to *do* something philosophically interesting with these remarks without assuming that, in order to be read productively, they must constitute finalized theses.

Additional difficulty in reading Wittgenstein comes from his idiosyncratic style. He typically writes in separate, short sections that look like fragments, rather than in clearly connected, argumentatively structured paragraphs. There are no chapters or clear thematic divisions in his works. Furthermore, it is widely agreed among interpreters that Wittgenstein often engages with various interlocutors, considering their attitudes and ideas before ultimately partially endorsing or rejecting their views. Wittgenstein does not explicitly state that he is doing this, nor is it always easy to identify the particular thinkers he uses as interlocutors, and so it is frequently difficult to establish the meaning and force of those remarks which engage with a particular voice.¹¹

0.3 *A Multifaceted Reading*

The interpretive stance that I advocate takes its guiding principles from within Wittgenstein's own work. A fundamental idea in the work of the later Wittgenstein is that of *seeing*

¹¹ There is also the question of how his earlier work is related to his later work, which an extremely important question I cannot discuss here. I will state here, in the interest of full disclosure, that I follow Steven Gerard and others in seeing strong continuity in Wittgenstein's philosophical thought; see Gerard, "One Wittgenstein" for one version of this view.

an aspect. Seeing an aspect of something is like seeing it with a particular interpretation: for example, seeing a stick-figure as an image of a human being, or seeing it as a traffic circle splitting off into roads and intersections. Wittgenstein's famous example is the image of the duck-rabbit: a figure in which it is possible to see either the head of a rabbit, or the head of a duck.

What Wittgenstein's philosophy does, I will argue, is loosen the hold of restrictive, dogmatic patterns of thought: to get us to give up, for example, the idea that every word gets its meaning by having a referent.¹² Such assumptions distort our thinking: we tend to "sublimate"¹³ the features of an aspect, or to see them as necessary truths, and therefore we tend to disregard the actual variety of aspects and phenomena.¹⁴ Many of the traditional puzzles of philosophy, mathematics, and the sciences, Wittgenstein suggests, are products of allowing a *singular* aspect or idea to dominate our thinking. The diversity of Wittgenstein's remarks, their seeming disconnectedness, and lack of theoretical framing, are all features deriving from his commitment to achieving freedom from the distorting forces of dogmatic systematization and theorizing.

To do this, Wittgenstein provides what are sometimes called "objects of comparison"¹⁵—hypothetical or actual examples, alternative theories or explanations, and, above all, new ways of conceiving of or looking at things, which are meant to demonstrate the possibility of adopting a different viewpoint on the issue which troubled us, allowing us to see that our previous way of looking at it, which seemed to embody necessary truths, is in fact not the only possible viewpoint. "Aha!" we might exclaim. "There's not only a rabbit, but also a duck there!"

¹² This is the error Wittgenstein sees in what is called "the Augustinian picture of language", discussed in the opening sections of the *Investigations*.

¹³ Wittgenstein's word for attributing necessity and mystical significance where it is inappropriate: cf. PI §38.

¹⁴ I am not saying that this is the only way our thoughts can become distorted; as we will see later, there are many.

¹⁵ I also use the formulation "comparison-objects".

This analogy—like all analogies—will have its limitations. Unlike many interpreters, I don't assume that I have, once and for all, solved all the mysteries of Wittgenstein's work. Instead, I follow Gordon Baker, in his least dogmatic passages, in offering my reading of Wittgenstein as a plausible and productive, but not exclusively correct, lens through which to view his work. Of course, it is possible to make mistakes in interpreting Wittgenstein, and I will argue that many of his readers did misunderstand him. Nonetheless, I believe the bounds of what constitutes a responsible reading are broad; I therefore offer my interpretation as one possibility within a family of responsible interpretations.

However, I still believe that I am providing a useful framework for understanding the text. I have aimed to be neither rigid nor too permissive. In developing the interpretive position, I engage with aspects of Wittgenstein's thought regarding inner processes, knowledge of other minds, and the relation between the 'inner' and the 'outer'. In these sections of the thesis, I aim only to demonstrate what my interpretive stance looks like in action, not to fully explain or critique Wittgenstein's thoughts on these matters. When read in the way I am proposing, the text becomes something much more complex—and therefore more interesting—than many interpreters have given it credit for. If my reading has only one virtue, I hope it is this.

The first chapter of the thesis discusses two influential types of interpretation. I first consider what I call "traditional readings", which see Wittgenstein as addressing traditional philosophical problems and offering theses, theories and arguments. Such readings, I argue, fundamentally misunderstand Wittgenstein by failing to take seriously his claims that he offers no such theses. I then briefly consider the reactions of so-called "quietists"—those who claim that Wittgenstein wants to end philosophy as traditionally conceived and ascribe to him the view that all philosophy is nonsense which must be eliminated—to traditional readers; I argue that quietists

themselves unwittingly lapse into a counterproductive dogmatism. I next consider the so-called “therapeutic” reading: the view that Wittgenstein treats philosophical problems as a form of disease caused by misunderstood or misapplied pictures of concepts found in language. While my own reading takes inspiration from the therapeutic reading, I argue that many therapeutic readers, too, fall into oversimplified approaches to Wittgenstein. I then turn to the details of my own interpretive approach in Chapter 2.

There, I argue that, when read in the way that I am proposing—as a thinker concerned with demonstrating overlooked possibilities—Wittgenstein offers an example of a way of thinking which can greatly enrich one’s own. The antidogmatic, challenging thought to be found in his work is potentially valuable in every field, as is the work of all of the greatest philosophers; it challenges us to reexamine our preconceptions and practices. I see in Wittgenstein, not a figure who signals the end of philosophy, but rather an opening up of endless philosophical possibilities.

CHAPTER 1: INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES TO WITTGENSTEIN

In this chapter, I will consider three types of interpretive approach to Wittgenstein, roughly in the order of their historical appearance: ‘traditional’, ‘quietist’, and ‘therapeutic’ interpretations. A traditional approach to Wittgenstein, as I will use the term, is one which attributes to him recognizable theses, theories, and arguments. Readers of this kind, prevalent among the first wave of scholars and interpreters, approach Wittgenstein’s texts in the spirit of traditional philosophical exegesis, reconstructing his remarks into something more logically explicit.¹⁶ These explicated arguments will then relate to traditional philosophical positions: Platonism, realism, and so on. Traditional interpreters disagree vehemently about the content, nature and scope of Wittgenstein’s claims concerning meaning-as-use, private language, rule-following, and so on, but are united in seeing philosophical theories and arguments in the text.

1.1 *Norman Malcolm on Wittgenstein’s Treatment of Other Minds*

For Norman Malcolm, as for many traditional interpreters, one of the questions at the heart of the *PI* is ‘How do we have knowledge of other minds?’ That is, given that all I can observe of other people is their behavior, how can I know exactly what they are thinking or feeling or even that they have minds at all? This problem, the traditional skeptical ‘problem of other minds’, arises because of an intuitive, dualistic conception in which there are two kinds of entities: inner objects and processes inside the mind—thoughts, feelings, sensations, and so on—and external, physical objects, including the body. Because it is difficult—but obviously necessary—to articulate how

¹⁶ A partial list of traditional readers, as I am using the term, includes Norman Malcolm, P.F. Strawson, Paul Feyerabend, A.J. Ayer, Rush Rhees, G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and his work with the early Gordon Baker, David Pears in his first book, Anthony Kenny, Barry Stroud, and, in a certain way, Saul Kripke.

these two types of thing interact with each other, the skeptic claims that it is, in fact, *impossible* to infer facts about the inner world of the minds of others from facts about the outer world.

Malcolm sees this epistemic problem as being, for Wittgenstein, connected to the problem of how psychological terms get their meaning: the “problem of how language is related to inner experiences”.^a For Malcolm, this question, and Wittgenstein’s rejection of the skeptical view that we can never have knowledge of the minds of others, are intimately bound up with the question of the possibility of a private language: “one that not merely is not but *cannot* be understood by anyone other than the speaker”.^b This would be a language the words of which would “refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations”.^c

As Malcolm says, “At bottom, [the idea of a private language] is the idea that there is only a contingent and not an *essential* connection between a sensation and its outward expression”.^d If the skeptic is right and we *cannot* know what other people are thinking or feeling, this is so because there is only a contingent connection between sensations and language: what I mean by ‘pain’ could be different from what another person means by the same word. I could be speaking a ‘private language’ every time I refer to my own sensations: only I could *really* know what I mean by ‘pain’, because no one else has access to the feeling I am describing. Malcolm writes:

Such thoughts as these are typical expressions of the idea of a private language: that I know only from my *own* case what the word ‘pain’ means;^e that I can only *believe* that someone else is in pain, but I *know* it if I am;^f that another person cannot have *my* pains;^g that I can undertake to call *this* (pointing inward) ‘pain’ in the future;^h that when I say ‘I am in pain’ I am at any rate justified *before myself*.ⁱ

According to Malcolm, Wittgenstein, by arguing against the possibility a private language, dissolves the skeptical problem of other minds without directly addressing it. If a private language is impossible, the skeptic cannot even raise her challenge, because her claim that “Only I really feel pain” requires that the word “pain” be defined, either in a private language or in our public

one (and if “pain” is publicly defined, the skeptic has already been defeated). According to Malcolm, Wittgenstein’s argument against a private language is straightforward: a private language could not exist, because words must be defined publicly in order to have meaning. There are two reasons for this. The first is that a private language couldn’t have rules ensuring that the same word was used for the same sensation across repeated occurrences. The use of a sensation-word in the private language would be fixed in the following way: “I... fix my attention on a pain as I pronounce the word ‘pain’ to myself”.^j The connection to the word is guaranteed by my act of private recognition of the sensation of pain as pain. “But ... My private definition was a success only if it led me to use the word correctly in the future”.^k And if I myself am the only judge of whether I applied the word ‘pain’ to the right sensation, “Whatever is going to seem right to me is right”.^l “My impression that I follow a rule does not confirm that I follow the rule, unless there can be something that will prove my impression correct”;^m and if I am the only judge of whether I am applying the rule ‘Call *this* sensation “pain”’, there can’t be anything that will prove my impression correct. One cannot follow a rule or apply a definition privately, because one cannot be the sole judge of whether one has followed that rule or definition: there must be an outside ‘check’.

But, an interlocutor wants to say, surely a rule is unnecessary: can’t I just resolve to always call the *same* sensation ‘pain’ in the future? No, Malcolm says, because there is no ‘criterion’ for the ‘sameness’ of a future sensation—one couldn’t even tell if a sensation were the same as what one had earlier resolved to call “pain”.¹⁷ The word ‘same’, just like ‘pain’, must have a criterion for its application: it cannot be defined just as ‘the same as this (one) thing’: for “How am I to apply what the *one* thing shows me to the case of two things?”.ⁿ Not only must I already have a

¹⁷ “Wittgenstein contrasts ‘criterion’ with ‘symptom,’ employing both words somewhat technically. The falling barometer is a ‘symptom’ that it is raining; its looking like *that* outdoors (think how you would teach the word ‘rain’ to a child) is the ‘criterion’ of rain... The satisfaction of the criterion of *y* establishes the existence of *y* beyond question (PI §354; Malcolm 63).

definition of the sensation to recognize it as pain, I must also know what it means for *this* sensation to be the ‘same’ as the original pain-sensation!

These problems—that the user of a private language could not have criteria for recognizing her own sensations and could not therefore define the words of the language—are, for Malcolm, ‘internal’ attacks on the skeptical position. The ‘external’ attack focuses on the solipsism lying behind the idea of the private language:¹⁸

A proponent of the privacy of sensations rejects circumstances and behavior as a criterion of the sensations of others... He does not need (and could not have) a criterion for the existence of pain that he feels. But surely he will need a criterion for the existence of pain that he does *not* feel. ... he ought to admit that he has not the faintest idea of what would count for or against the occurrence of sensations that he does not feel. His conclusion should be, not that it is a contradiction, but that it is unintelligible to speak of the sensations of others.⁹

And if it is *unintelligible* to speak of the sensations of others, the advocate of private language cannot even begin to make her case. She would have to argue: I can only know what pain is from my own case, because other people’s behavior doesn’t count (they could be faking). Therefore, other people might not *really* ever have pain. But for this argument to be intelligible, the skeptic would have to know what would count for or against those other peoples’ having pain—and this is exactly what she *can’t* know, because she has rejected any possibility of a criterion for it.

Malcolm then moves to a positive account of how words refer to the sensations of ourselves and others, which he admits is not easy to find: “One would *like* to find a continuous exposition of [Wittgenstein’s] own thesis, instead of mere hints here and there”.^{19,p} Instead, Malcolm says,

Wittgenstein asks the question “How do words *refer* to sensations?” transforms it into the question “How does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations?” and gives this answer: “Words are connected with the primitive, the natural expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself

¹⁸ Here, the skeptic’s view that he can only *know* that he is in pain, while he can at most *guess* that other people are in pain.

¹⁹ I will return to this admission later in the chapter.

and he cries; and then the adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behavior”.^q

This is a straightforward theory of how sensation-language is learned: I hurt myself, I cry out in pain, someone says, “Oh, are you in pain?”, and I learn the word ‘pain’. Furthermore, there is “an *analogy* between the groan of pain and the utterance of [the] words [I am in pain]”,^r to which Wittgenstein is drawing our attention. Both the groan and the utterance are ‘incurrable’: “A man cannot be in *error* as to whether he is in pain; he cannot say ‘My leg hurts’ by mistake, any more than he can groan by mistake”.^s I do not, in my own case, look inward and call a sensation ‘pain’ (or not): crying out in pain is an *exclamation*, an expression of pain, not a statement.

Incurrable expressions will then be one of the criteria for pain, and “it will not make sense for one to suppose that another person is not in pain if one’s criterion of his being in pain is satisfied”.^t In the case of applying ‘pain’ to someone else, all that is necessary to refute the skeptic is to provide a criterion for doing so.²⁰ The criteria for applying ‘pain’ correctly are someone’s physical behavior, circumstances, and words. These criteria will apply to anyone regarded as human,²¹ and, if satisfied, will settle beyond doubt whether someone is in pain. There is still a possibility of being mistaken: it does not *follow* from someone’s behavior and circumstances that she is in pain, but “I can be as *certain* of someone else’s sensations as of any fact”.^u The criterion is what is necessary for the correct application of the word, and anything else is superfluous. The criterion is simply part of our ‘form of life’, and it just is a fact that we say that someone is in pain when she meets these criteria;^v nothing else can be required.

²⁰ This is because a criterion’s being met ensures complete certainty; see fn 2.

²¹ “‘Only of a human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious’ (PI §281). The *human* body and *human* behavior are the *paradigm* to which third-person attributions of consciousness, sensations, feelings are related” (Malcolm 67). Malcolm therefore reads Wittgenstein as saying that we (at least unconsciously) make use of *analogy* with a human being when making ascriptions of psychological concepts.

Malcolm is an insightful reader, and his mistakes are subtle. They come down to the fact that he attributes Wittgenstein a theory revolving around the technical use of the word ‘criteria’.²² Wittgenstein makes no such technical use of the word ‘criteria’. Malcolm, and others who ascribe a criteria-based theory of sensation-talk to Wittgenstein, cite *PI* §244:

How do words *refer* to sensations? ... Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, natural, expressions of sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behavior.

It is important to note that Wittgenstein introduces the remark by saying “Here is *one* possibility”; the possibility is not claimed to be definitive, or even to be empirically true or false. Wittgenstein does not refer to ‘criteria’ to explain *how* the child learns the new pain-behavior: he says merely that, when the child cries out, adults teach the child to say, “That hurts!”, and he doesn’t even say *how* they teach this, or that the adults use criteria to determine that the child is in pain.

But isn’t all Malcolm is doing—explaining what ‘criterion’ means—really ‘grammatical’, like Wittgenstein says his philosophy is? What it is important to see is that Malcolm builds an epistemological *theory* on the supposed technical use of the word ‘criteria’. While Wittgenstein does use the word ‘criterion’ throughout the *PI*, often to refer to a way of checking the correctness of a statement,²³ nowhere does he make the epistemological claim that criteria are the basis for all knowledge. Nor does he offer a theory of how we use criteria in order to explain sensation-talk.

²² Malcolm, like Chihara and Fodor and many earlier interpreters, takes Wittgenstein’s views in the Blue Book to be earlier formulations of the views he holds in the Investigations, and bases much of his understanding of the discussion of pain and pain-behavior on remarks found in that book. The BB is based on lecture notes from students who studied with Wittgenstein between 1933 and 1935; there is a ten-year difference between these lectures and the primary parts of the Investigations, and, furthermore, the discussions of pain and pain-behavior in the Investigations contain numerous differences from those found in the BB.

²³ E.g. *PI* §344: “Our criterion for someone’s saying something to himself is what he tells us, as well as the rest of his behavior”.

1.11 *A Dissenting Voice: Chihara and Fodor contra Malcolm's Wittgenstein*

Traditionally, philosophical interpreters reconstruct a philosopher's view and the arguments supporting it, then critique it or defend it against objections: thus some think that, if Wittgenstein is offering philosophical arguments, the best we can do as interpreters is construct those arguments, and then see what their merits are.²⁴ One early critique of Wittgenstein's views can be found in Charles Chihara and Jerry Fodor's essay "Operationalism and Ordinary Language", in which they ascribe to Wittgenstein a philosophical thesis which they call "logical behaviorism": "the doctrine that there are logical or conceptual relations of the sort denied by the skeptical premiss"^a that knowledge of other minds is impossible, namely, that the connection between mental states and behavior is logical and necessary, not merely contingent and empirical.

Wittgenstein's alleged logical behaviorism depends on a view of language Chihara and Fodor call "operationalism": the view "that analyzing the meaning of a word involves exhibiting the role or use of the word in the various language-games in which it occurs":^b

Consider... one of the language-games that imparts meaning to such words as "length", i.e., that of reporting the dimensions of physical objects. To describe this game, one would have to include an account of the procedures involved in measuring lengths... "The meaning of the word 'length' is learnt, among other things, by learning what it is to determine length"^c

Being able to use a word correctly, on this view, is being able to operate correctly with it: the meaning of the word is the set of operations it names. "To analyze such words as 'pain,' 'motive,' 'dream,' etc., will *inter alia* involve articulating the operations or observations in terms of which we determine that someone is in pain, or that he has such and such a motive, or that he has

²⁴ I am of course not saying that this is the *wrong* way to use a philosophical text, merely that it is one way among others.

dreamed”.^{25, d} This analysis of the word fixes a logical connection between the word and its meaning: “Reference to the characteristic features of pain behavior on the basis of which we determine that someone is in pain is essential to the philosophical analysis of the word ‘pain’”.^e

The question then is “what, specifically, is this logical connection... between pain-behavior and pain?”.^f Like Malcolm, Chihara and Fodor take ‘criteria’ to be Wittgenstein’s technical term for the markers which will logically entail that someone is in pain. For them, the relation between a criterion and what it is a criterion for is like that between putting a basketball through the hoop and scoring a field goal: it is a logical rule.^g Chihara and Fodor also believe that criteria must be teachable: “For the teaching of a particular predicate ‘Y’ to be successful, the pupil must learn the rules for the use of ‘Y’ and hence must learn the criteria for ‘Y’ if there are such criteria”.^{26, h}

Chihara and Fodor read a set of comments on toothache in the *Blue Book*²⁷ as defending the later claim in the *PI* that “an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria”:ⁱ

...on Wittgenstein’s view, empirical justification of the claim to see, recognize, or know that such and such is the case *on the basis of some observable feature or state of affairs*, would have to rest upon inductions from observed correlations... Wittgenstein appears to be arguing that the possibility of ever inferring a person’s toothache from his behavior requires the existence of a criterion of toothache that can sometimes be observed to maintain.^j

While they admit that it does not seem that Wittgenstein is saying *all* predicates “presuppose criteria of applicability”,^k they agree with Malcolm in asserting that Wittgenstein believes that psychological predicates like ‘pain’ stand in need of outward criteria.

²⁵ Throughout the article, Chihara and Fodor refer to an article by Malcolm, “Dreaming”, which can also be found in Morick’s *Wittgenstein and the Problem of Other Minds*. In this article, Malcolm applies his understanding of Wittgenstein’s claims about sensations and criteria to the phenomena of dreaming.

²⁶ Like Malcolm, Chihara and Fodor read Wittgenstein’s common remarks focusing on teaching children math, or how to use words, as demonstrating an important component of his ‘theory’ of criteria; see the discussion of Malcolm and e.g. *PI* §§143-8, §185-90.

²⁷ Cf. BB 24, and e.g. BB 49: “In order to see that it is conceivable that one person should have pain in another person’s body, one must examine what sort of facts we call criteria for a pain being in a certain place”. It is certainly possible that, at the time the notes comprising the BB were taken, Wittgenstein held a view of criteria like Malcolm’s; that does not concern us here.

Unlike Malcolm, however, they believe that the argument “at best... supports Wittgenstein’s position only on the assumption that the skeptic is not right. That is, it demonstrates that there must be criteria for psychological predicates by assuming that such predicates are sometimes applied justifiably”.¹ Instead, Wittgenstein ought to be arguing that a skeptic would end up with “the absurd conclusion that it must be impossible to teach the meaning of these psychological predicates”;^m that, “if the skeptic were right, the preconditions for teaching the meaning of the mental predicates of our ordinary language could not be satisfied”.ⁿ They cite PI §257: “What would it be like if human beings showed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word ‘toothache’”.

However, taking Malcolm’s “Dreaming” to be an application of Wittgenstein’s views on criteria,²⁸ Chihara and Fodor argue that, because “there exist no criteria for first person applications of many psychological predicates”,^o the view cannot capture first-person uses of these predicates and must be mistaken. Furthermore, it would, absurdly, entail that scientists “who have attempted to answer such questions as ‘How long do dreams last?’ are involved in conceptual confusions rather than empirical determinations”,^p and therefore require understanding a great number of scientific principles in ways that are counterintuitive or unscientific (e.g., requiring that vapor-trails could not be a criterion for the presence and motion of particles in a cloud-chamber).^{29, q}

²⁸ The view, as they state it, is that “psychologists attempting to discover methods of measuring the duration of dreams must be using the term ‘dream’ in a misleading and extraordinary way” (Chihara and Fodor 191). Essentially, Malcolm argues that, based on Wittgenstein’s remark that the criterion of a dream is the dream-report, there cannot be an ‘inner process’ which corresponds to the word “dreaming”, and therefore looking for an inner process which would explain the use of that word is wrongheaded. In the essay, Malcolm claims that he is “applying to dreaming the points made by Wittgenstein in his attack on the notion that one learns what thinking, remembering, mental images, sensations, and so on, are from ‘one’s own case’” (Malcolm 216).

²⁹ “According to present scientific theories, the formation of tiny, thin bands of fog on the glass of surface of [the Wilson cloud-chamber] indicates the passage of charged particles through the chamber. It is obvious that the formation of these streaks is not a Wittgensteinian criterion... That one can detect these charged particles... by means of such devices is surely not... a *conceptual* truth. [...] Such cases suggest that Wittgenstein failed to consider all the possible types of answers to the question, “What is the justification for the claim that one can tell, recognize, or determine that *Y* applies on the basis of the presence of *X*?” (Chihara and Fodor 193) Thus Chihara and

Since they believe this to be absurd, they take the view of criteria advocated by Malcolm's Wittgenstein to be deeply mistaken. Instead, they argue that, in learning psychological predicates, we learn not criteria but "complex conceptual connections which interrelate a wide variety of mental states... [which will] explain someone's behavior by reference to his motives, intentions, beliefs, desires, or sensations",^r an "unabashedly nonbehavioristic view".^{30, s}

Chihara and Fodor, in their unsympathetic reading, make a number of mistakes. In *PI* §109, Wittgenstein is clear that he will not be advancing any kind of psychological theory:

Our considerations must not be scientific ones... And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must be nothing hypothetical in our considerations. All *explanation* must disappear, and description alone must take its place.

The mistake made by Chihara and Fodor is obvious: they take Wittgenstein to be offering a theory, logical behaviorism, which they oppose with a rival theory. These theories are both concerned with *explaining* how we ascribe sensations to others: yet Wittgenstein explicitly rejects explaining anything. Both theories contain many empirical claims that could be confirmed or denied by experimental psychology; yet Wittgenstein expressly rejects any 'scientific' considerations, and furthermore, any theses which might be counterargued: "If someone were to advance *theses* in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them".^t

But perhaps, someone might say, Wittgenstein, although not advancing an *empirical* theory, could still be offering an epistemological theory which would explain what constitutes *knowledge* that someone else is in pain: isn't this what Chihara and Fodor's logical behaviorism is

Fodor believe (1) Wittgenstein has a technical theory of criteria and (2) this theory is supposed to apply to every type of evidence-based justification.

³⁰ "On this view, our success in accounting for the behavior on the basis of which mental predicates are applied might properly be thought of as supplying *evidence* for the existence of the mental processes we postulate. It does so by attesting to the adequacy of the conceptual system in terms of which the processes are understood. The behavior would be, in that sense, analogous to the cloud-chamber track on the basis of which we detect the presence and motion of charged particles" (Chihara and Fodor 196). Their view is that humans form a mental conceptual scheme including the various mental processes and proceeds scientifically, updating and refining this scheme on the basis of observed behaviors; the child learning to use such a conceptual scheme is like a miniature psychologist.

really aiming at? However, an epistemological theory is still intended to *explain*, not simply to ‘describe’: but philosophy, Wittgenstein says, “just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything”.¹¹ Even an epistemological theory aims to explain how we come to know something—so Wittgenstein must not even be advancing an epistemological theory.

1.12 *Shared Assumptions of Traditional Readers*

Essentially, the disagreement between Malcolm and Chihara and Fodor comes down to whether criteria can logically entail the state for which they are criteria: in the case of pain, whether the criteria of pain can logically entail that someone is in pain. Malcolm answers in the affirmative, although he allows that, when the criteria are satisfied, there is still room for an everyday kind of doubt (e.g. that the person is faking). Chihara and Fodor, who understand the relation between criteria and the state they are criteria for to be strict logical entailment, believe that such logical entailment is impossible and requires too much of a theory; thus, they reject such an account. We have spent time on this seemingly technical disagreement because seeing what these views share can help us see what is misguided in these and similar approaches.

The assumption that Malcolm, Chihara and Fodor, and other traditional interpreters share is that, if Wittgenstein is saying anything at all, he must be arguing for philosophical theses and theories: that he is making philosophical claims which could be proven correct or incorrect. One result of this is the view that, if Wittgenstein is denying the importance of inner objects, he must be a behaviorist. One of Wittgenstein’s interlocutors in fact accuses him of being so:

“But aren’t you nevertheless a behaviorist in disguise? Aren’t you nevertheless basically saying that everything except human behavior is a fiction” – If I speak of a fiction, then it is of a *grammatical* fiction.^a

Wittgenstein, however, is not advancing a behaviorist thesis. What would it mean for ‘inner states’ to be an *actual*, not merely a grammatical, fiction? Well, Wittgenstein says, “To deny the mental process [of remembering] would mean to deny the remembering; to deny that anyone ever remembers anything”.^b Wittgenstein does not want to deny that things like remembering happen: “It is only that ‘There has just taken place in me the mental process of remembering...’ means nothing more than ‘I have just remembered...’”.^c Furthermore, Wittgenstein is consistently opposed to reductionist moves like claiming that mental processes are simply *physiological* processes: “A hypothesis, such as that such-and-such goes on in our bodies when we talk silently to ourselves, is of interest to us only in that it points to a possible use of the expression “I said... to myself”: namely, that of inferring the physiological process from the expression”.^{31, d}

To a certain extent, traditional interpreters confuse *imaginability* with *necessity*. Like those who quote the law of the excluded middle and say, ‘Either an inner image is before his mind or it isn’t’,^e they make the mistake of seeing only two possibilities: either the truth is there are inner sensations or there are not. If Wittgenstein is demonstrating that it is not necessary to *think* of sensation-language as entailing inner processes—that it is not necessary to see using that picture of the inner realm—he *must* think it is necessary to adopt the opposite stance, which is behaviorism. But this is not the case: Wittgenstein is opposing the *necessity* of thinking in terms of an inner object, and, by giving up this idea, we do not end up as behaviorists.

Some interpreters, including, as we have seen, Malcolm, but also P.M.S. Hacker and the early Gordon Baker,³² in attempting to reconcile what they perceive in the text with Wittgenstein’s

³¹ Cf. also RPP I §1012: “I want to say: At first the physiological explanation [here, of what happens when one sees a figure one way or another] is apparently a help, but then at once it turns out to be a mere catalyst of thoughts. I introduce it only to rid myself of it again at once.”

³² P.M.S. Hacker and Gordon Baker collaborated on a multivolume project entitled *An Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations*. In these works, they operate from the premise that Wittgenstein engages

methodological comments, come to the conclusion that Wittgenstein is offering a different kind of theory: a ‘grammatical’ one. Wittgenstein’s aim would be much like the conceptual investigation of someone like Gilbert Ryle:³³ to describe how we, as a matter of fact, use language, and by doing so, to create an order in our concepts and language which would prevent confusions like those of the other-minds skeptic. Malcolm writes, for example, that “If we want to understand any concept we must obtain a view of the human behavior, the activities, the natural expressions, that surround the words for that concept”.^f Once we get a clear view of what we in fact do, once we describe the grammar of the language-games we play, we get a clear statement of a non-theory which answers the philosophical problem and gives us a clear, ordered set of concepts which allow us to avoid philosophical problems in the future. These readers see the ‘theories’ Wittgenstein is rejecting as being metaphysical or scientific³⁴ ones: therefore, a grammatical theory would be acceptable.

But Wittgenstein rejects giving a grammatical theory just as strongly. Those who attribute Wittgenstein such a theory cite *PI* §122: “A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have *an overview* of the use of our words. – Our grammar is deficient in surveyability”.^g The basis of the grammatical theory, then, will be the “surveyable representation”:^h some kind of fully analyzed, true representation of a concept.³⁵ But, Wittgenstein, claims, this true grammar is illusory: “We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound and essential... resides in... trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language”.ⁱ Language simply can’t be represented

in ‘conceptual clarification’: that is, he solves philosophical problems by showing us the way that the grammar of our concepts *actually* works.

³³ In Ryle’s *The Concept of Mind*, for example, he argues that a proper understanding of our mental concepts allows us to see that the Cartesian mind/body duality is a dangerous myth. In this book, he proceeds using “conceptual analysis”: by exposing “category-mistakes”, or concepts which have been mistakenly placed in an inappropriate conceptual category, he demonstrates that what have previously been thought of as ghostly goings-on in the mind, that is, mental acts, can be accounted for more properly without the Cartesian framework.

³⁴ Philosophical doctrines consciously modeled after the methods of science, e.g. logical positivism.

³⁵ See, for example, the work of Hacker and Baker.

accurately this way: “The more closely we examine actual language, the greater becomes the conflict between it and our requirement” of clarity.^j

Wittgenstein also does not seek to create a new, ‘ideal’ grammar: “We don’t want to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of ways. For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed *complete* clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should *completely* disappear”.^k Descriptions of grammar are not definitive, but constructed for a particular use: “We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order for a particular purpose, one out of many possible orders, not *the* order”.^l Achieving ‘*the* order’, a perfect grammatical theory—or any theory—isn’t what Wittgenstein is after.

1.2 Quietist Readings of Wittgenstein

Because of evidence in the text that Wittgenstein is, in fact, offering something *other* than traditional philosophical theories and arguments, many interpreters began to turn against traditional readings of Wittgenstein. Among these, some readers took the extreme position that Wittgenstein not only refused to advance philosophical theories in his *own* work, but aimed to show that philosophy is nothing but nonsense.³⁶ The most extreme of these readers³⁷ attribute to Wittgenstein a robust quietism: philosophy should not seek to say anything positive at all; rather,

³⁶ For many readers, justification for this view is to be found in the *TLP*. Whereas traditional readers tended to see major discontinuity between the *TLP* and *PI*, quietists frequently see a strong continuity in terms of the project, begun in the *TLP*, to show that philosophy is dangerous nonsense. “No-nonsense readers” of the *TLP*, for example, many of whose views are collected in the volume *The New Wittgenstein*, take their inspiration from the later parts of that work, including proposition 6.54: “My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright”. For a cogent discussion of this reading of the *TLP*, see Cora Diamond’s essay “Throwing Away the Ladder”.

³⁷ See, on the *Investigations*, John McDowell’s “Wittgenstein on Following a Rule”, Crispin Wright’s “Rule Following Without Reasons”, and Jason Bridge’s “Wittgenstein vs. Contextualism”, all of which explicitly claim to be quietist accounts; for readings of the *TLP*, see *The New Wittgenstein*, previous footnote.

it should be devoted entirely to the destruction of nonsense. Quietists do not form a coherent, organized group, and I do not have space to do justice to the many shades of the view present in different interpreters.³⁸ Instead, I will briefly state why I am *not* advocating any form of quietism.

Just as traditional readers face the puzzle of why Wittgenstein states that he is not advancing any theories, quietist readers face the puzzle of why Wittgenstein so often says that he is doing philosophy. In stating that Wittgenstein has a unified, broad metaphilosophical theory—a unified conception of what philosophy is, the limits of philosophy, and a unified approach or attitude toward philosophy—but *no* philosophical theories, quietist readers sometimes seem to be making a self-refuting claim: why should a philosopher who they themselves believe is so universally antidogmatic be so dogmatic in his conception of philosophy? Adamant that Wittgenstein advances no theories, these readers attribute to him an extremely simplistic and sweeping anti-philosophical theory of philosophy. For example, Paul Horwich, in his book *Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy*, goes so far as to draw up an eight-point account of Wittgensteinian problem-elimination, a position which entails that *every philosophical problem can be solved the same way*: on his account, Wittgenstein has an *extremely robust* metaphilosophical theory, and a practical, step-by-step account of how to dissolve philosophical problems. This is ludicrous, and not to be found anywhere in the text. Finally, seeing Wittgenstein as a quietist simply fails to account for the variety of ways in which his later work interacts with philosophical problems. By fixating on Wittgenstein's disdain for philosophical 'nonsense' and failing to investigate other remarks in the text, quietist readers simply fail to produce a rich account of Wittgenstein's writings.

³⁸ For a less extreme example, see Robert Fogelin's *Taking Wittgenstein at His Word*.

1.3 *Baker and the Therapeutic Reading*

Late in his career, G.P. Baker became dissatisfied with the reading he and P.M.S. Hacker had previously advanced. Instead, he developed a new interpretation of Wittgenstein, presented in a series of papers which were collected and published after his death as *Wittgenstein's Method: Neglected Aspects*, edited by his widow and colleague Katherine Morris. In these late papers, Baker makes two important interpretive claims: first, that Wittgenstein's later philosophy has many structural and methodological similarities to psychoanalysis, and second, that these similarities should be explained by the influence Freud had on the later Wittgenstein. Baker's interpretive approach thus takes Freudian psychoanalysis as an important, but thus far neglected, "comparison-object", the use of which reveals that Wittgenstein's philosophy is a kind of therapy. This approach naturally came to be known as the 'therapeutic' reading, and has a number of influential contemporary followers.³⁹ Some interpreters focus on the later Wittgenstein's structural and methodological similarities to the psychoanalytic method *without* claiming that Wittgenstein was influenced by Freud; Baker, however, is adamant that the structural similarities are to be *explained* by reference to the historical influence Freud had on Wittgenstein, and grounds his claims in textual evidence that suggest that Freud decisively influenced Wittgenstein's thought.

1.31 *The Analogy with Psychoanalysis*

According to Baker, the connections between Wittgenstein's philosophy and psychoanalysis are many, and they run deep. On his view, Wittgenstein's writings treat various

³⁹ This view was anticipated in many ways by earlier readers like Oets Bouwsma, John Wisdom, and Stanley Cavell. Contemporary readers include James Conant, Marie McGinn, David Stern, Phil Hutchinson, and Rom Harré, as well as Oskari Kuusela, who will be discussed in the next section. These readers all accept Baker's first claim, that Wittgenstein's philosophy shares characteristics with therapy, but do not necessarily accept Baker's claim that Wittgenstein consciously modeled his work after Freud's.

‘philosophical illnesses’ using methods drawn directly from psychoanalysis. In Freudian psychoanalysis, as understood by Baker,⁴⁰ an analyst cures patients by demonstrating to them the influence that unconscious beliefs and desires have on their behavior and thought; once recognized, these beliefs disappear or become inert, and the patients are relieved of their neurosis. The final proof of the cure will be the patient’s acknowledgment of their unconscious belief and the loosening of its grip on the patient’s thought. In the same way, Wittgenstein’s goal is to treat someone suffering from philosophical problems that cause ‘philosophical anxiety’. Wittgenstein’s method, like the psychoanalytic method, is *person-relative*: different sufferers will require different cures. The text has the structure of a dialogue, in which Wittgenstein provides a ‘talking cure’ to the tormented philosopher.

Someone develops philosophical anxiety because she has an ‘unconscious picture’, or mistaken analogy, which distorts her thinking on an issue. Like the unconscious belief of the psychoanalytic analysand,⁴¹ this unconscious picture causes and structures the person’s philosophical neurosis. The unconscious picture is deeply entrenched, and “becomes dogmatic, thought by the patient to be the *only* possible way of seeing things. Because of this belief, the patient is led to make philosophical claims which seem to her truthful and important, but in fact are simply misunderstandings or illusions produced by her philosophical illness. By providing the sufferer with alternative pictures and analogies, which Baker calls ‘comparison-objects’,⁴² Wittgenstein frees her of her philosophical anxiety, as well as the urge to say nonsensical,

⁴⁰ Freud’s theoretical work and practice went through many different developmental stages, and scholars and analysts differ greatly in their interpretation of both parts of his work. Later developments in psychotherapy draw from Freud in many different and often incompatible ways. Here, I am not entering into these discussion, but only presenting Freud as Baker understood him.

⁴¹ The person undergoing analysis.

⁴² “An object of comparison... is employed to exhibit aspects of ‘the use of our words’” (Baker 32). Baker’s examples include Goethe’s primal plant, a landscape painting (in reference to a proposition), the notation of set theory (again regarding a proposition), the color wheel, and many others. For him, comparison-objects are what Wittgenstein calls “perspicuous representations”: objects which render surveyable aspects of our grammar.

philosophical things. The comparison-objects allow for the recognition of a new possibility: that we can explain mental states *without* recourse to inner objects, for example.


In the case of the other-minds skeptic, Baker does not characterize Wittgenstein as providing “a *reductio* of Cartesian dualism”,^a as Malcolm does; rather, Baker sees Wittgenstein as unveiling “the subtle but catastrophic influence that the *picture* of the mind as a ‘secret realm’ exercises on” the philosopher.^b Wittgenstein aims not “at the task of inscribing in minute detail the grammar of the names of sensations (or of inner states)” but “at the clarification of the temptations that we have to go astray while doing so”.^c On Baker’s view, Wittgenstein’s response to the problems created by the inner/outer distinction is “to get us to see a grammatical fiction”.^d “It seems as if we are constrained to choose between two equally false propositions, namely that pain and the behavior which expresses it are two different things, or that the pain is the same thing as the behavior”;^e but these are false appearances, “grammatical illusions” that are created by conceiving of sensation-names on the model “of the relation of name and object”,^f that is, as necessarily gaining their meaning in virtue of referring to particular inner objects.⁴³ By getting us to see that our temptation to speak of ‘an inner world’ was caused by the entrenched picture of the name-object relation, Wittgenstein allows us to free ourselves from the anxiety-inducing problem about inner states. Once the unconscious picture is recognized, and the possibility of giving up that picture is demonstrated, the philosophical problem loses its anxiety-inducing character, and can be seen for what it is: an illusion caused by a philosophical illness. The sufferer has not been given

⁴³ Baker’s ‘grammatical illusion’ is strikingly similar to Ryle’s idea of a ‘category mistake’: two forms of expression are being conflated which do not belong together. That is, Cartesian dualism “represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category, when they actually belong to another” (Ryle 26). However, Ryle views the results of his conceptual analysis as getting at grammatical *truths*, whereas, for Baker, the usefulness of the philosopher’s techniques—e.g. reminding the patient of grammatical facts—ends once the philosophical problem is treated.

a counter-argument to a theory she held, which causes her to accept a new theory; rather, she has stopped to think in a confused and anxiety-inducing way.

The sufferer's recognition of a new possibility is compared by Baker to the seeing of a new aspect. The concept of aspect-seeing is introduced in the *PPF* using a now-famous illustration:

In my remarks, the following figure, derived from Jastrow, will be called “the duck-rabbit”. It can be seen as a rabbit's head or as a duck's.^g



And I must distinguish between the ‘continuous seeing’ of an aspect and an aspect's ‘lighting up’.

The picture might have been shown me, without my ever seeing in it anything but a rabbit.^h

The duck-rabbit picture has two ‘aspects’: one is a duck, and the other is a rabbit. Like many gestalt-images⁴⁴ and optical illusions, it is possible to not realize that the picture can be seen in multiple ways; to see it just as a rabbit, for example. One would be ‘continuously’ seeing the rabbit-aspect. But upon some prompting (“Can’t you see the beak?”) the duck-aspect might ‘light up’, and afterwards one could see the duck as well. According to Baker, “Wittgenstein’s discussion of... aspects takes its rise from an apparent paradox: when an aspect dawns on me, nothing has changed in what I *see*, yet everything *looks* different”.ⁱ “In one sense, what I see... is the same as before; in another sense, what I see (e.g. a rabbit as opposed to a duck) is entirely different”.^j

For Baker, two of the most important features of “the logic (grammar) of purely visual aspect-seeing” are aspects’ global pluralism— “When we see a picture as a duck, this does *not*

⁴⁴A ‘gestalt’ is a whole which cannot be explained purely in terms of its parts; gestalt psychology of perception claims that humans naturally perceive not in terms of components but in terms of wholes. An example of a gestalt-image is the famous example of the Dalmatian hidden among black blotches on a white background; once one has seen a part of the dog as a part of the dog, say the ears or tail, it is very difficult to avoid seeing the whole dog.

exclude the possibility of our also seeing it as a rabbit (on another occasion)”—and local incompatibility— “aspects are transiently exclusionary; it is impossible to see a picture *simultaneously* as a duck and a rabbit.” Furthermore, “visual aspects are essentially non-additive: i.e. there is no such thing as combining two ways of seeing something to produce a single more comprehensive way of seeing it”.^k Another important point is what Baker calls the “paradox of modality”: “I cannot demonstrate to somebody that there is a *possibility* of seeing a particular aspect of something... without getting him *actually* to see this aspect”.^l

1.32 *Evidence for the Therapeutic Reading*

Let us first consider Baker’s evidence for the historical claim he makes, namely, that Wittgenstein came to the central insights of his later philosophy by reading Freud. Surprisingly, Baker’s evidence for this claim comes primarily from a 1956 essay by Friedrich Waismann entitled “How I see Philosophy”. Waismann was a former student of Moritz Schlick, the founder of the Vienna Circle; from 1927 until around 1936, he had regular conversations with Wittgenstein, many of which he recorded and which are published in *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, 1979.⁴⁵ In “How I See Philosophy”, Waismann sets out a vision of philosophy closely modeled on Freudian psychotherapy; a vision which, according to Baker, “is very closely based on material that Wittgenstein dictated to Waismann during the period 1931-5”.^a For Waismann, philosophy’s project is “the piercing of the dead crust of tradition and convention... so as to attain a new and broader way of looking at things”.^b The analogy with psychoanalysis, for Waismann, seemed to hold “the key to unlocking Wittgenstein’s distinctive method”.^c Although Baker concedes that the

⁴⁵ The Vienna Circle, associated with the doctrine of logical empiricism—the central claim of which is that only verifiable statements are meaningful—was a group of philosophers and scientists including Schlick, Waismann, Otto Neurath, Kurt Gödel, and Rudolf Carnap, among others.

vision of psychoanalytic philosophy advanced by Waismann may be “more extensive and more definite than anything that Wittgenstein himself had in mind”, Baker believes that Waismann’s writings correctly highlight an *aspect* of Wittgenstein’s method. He sees Waismann as effectively portraying the heart of Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy: that

in philosophy there are no proofs; there are no theorems; and there are no questions which can be decided, Yes or No.^d

The philosopher must try to get his patient to make a *decision*, to accept a new way of seeing things with his *spontaneous* consent.^e

Baker relies upon these and other ties Waismann saw between philosophy and psychoanalysis in arguing that “there was a definite phase of Wittgenstein’s thinking in which close comparison with Freud’s methods informed his own”,^f and thus Wittgenstein was consciously influenced by Freud.

Baker also relies upon remarks in which Wittgenstein mentions Freud or psychoanalysis, particularly those in the *Big Typescript*, a typescript compiled in 1933, constituting Wittgenstein’s first attempt to set forth his approach to philosophy after his return to the discipline.^g Baker cites two places in which Wittgenstein explicitly compares his work to psychoanalysis:

We can only convict another person of a mistake... if he really acknowledges this expression as the correct expression of his feeling.
For only if he acknowledges it as such, *is* it the correct expression.
(Psychoanalysis).^h

Difficulty of philosophy, not the intellectual difficulty of the sciences, but the difficulty of a change of attitude. Resistances of the will to be overcome.ⁱ

Baker sees the words “acknowledge” and “resistances” as clearly tying Wittgenstein’s thinking to Freud’s. In Baker’s view, Wittgenstein is not merely comparing his idea of philosophical acknowledgment to Freud’s, but directly adapting Freud’s idea.

However, as P.M.S. Hacker notes in his essay, “Gordon Baker’s Late Interpretation of Wittgenstein”, the historical evidence suggesting that Wittgenstein *consciously* modeled his work

after Freud's is tenuous at best. Relying on Waismann's book and other dictations given by Wittgenstein, Hacker rightly claims,

...is methodologically unsound... First, Wittgenstein never refined or approved of the dictations. Given the extent to which he worked over his own notes and typescripts, it is perilous to assume that the 'voices of Wittgenstein' that can be heard in the dictations are voices that he would uniformly be willing to acknowledge as expressing his definitive view.^j

Furthermore, the dictations were given between 1931-5, while Wittgenstein was working on the *Big Typescript*, and should not necessarily be taken as representative of his views ten years later, during the composition of the *PI*. Moreover, there is textual evidence suggesting that Wittgenstein's attitude towards Freud's views was not wholly positive. He says in reference to 'resistance', for example, that

He [Freud] speaks of overcoming resistance. One "instance" is deluded by another "instance" ... The analyst is supposed to be stronger, able to combat and overcome the delusion of the instance. But there is no way of showing that the whole result of analysis may not be delusion.^k

And he says of Freud that "he wanted to find some one explanation that would show what dreaming is",^l a project the later Wittgenstein would certainly regard as misguided.

Fortunately for Baker, his historical-causal and his structural claims need not stand or fall together: we can agree that the historical claim is probably unsound and yet find Baker's therapeutic reading insightful. Baker's point, when he is being careful, is simply that psychoanalysis is a *useful comparison-object* for Wittgenstein's method.

Baker finds evidence for this structural claim—that what Wittgenstein *does* is analogous to what the analyst does—everywhere in Wittgenstein's texts, when approached from the therapeutic interpretive position.⁴⁶ In her introduction to the posthumous collection *Wittgenstein's*

⁴⁶ Thus, the main virtue of Baker's reading is that it persuasively accounts for the discussion of philosophy in *PI* §§89-133.

Method, Katherine Morris summarizes Baker's claim by outlining seven clear points of comparison between Wittgenstein's philosophy and psychoanalysis: (a) the presence of anxiety, (b) person-relativity, (c) the presence of an interlocutor, (d) the importance of unconscious pictures, (e) the formation of prejudices, and (f) the motive to apply them; and (g) freedom from the unconscious picture at the root of the philosophical problem. We will consider each in turn.

(a) *Anxiety*. The goal of Wittgenstein's philosophy, according to Baker, is to resolve a philosopher's anxiety, as the goal of psychoanalysis is to resolve a patient's. The anxiety is the philosophical problem: the point of addressing a philosophical problem "is not to solve an enigma, but to bring relief to a person who is manifestly sick and unhappy".^m Baker cites the *Big Typescript* §421: "As I conduct philosophy, its *entire task* consists in shaping expressions so that certain *disquiets* (*Beunruhigungen*)... disappear".

However, Wittgenstein speaks of a variety of philosophical problems, not all of which can be understood as disturbances.⁴⁷ Baker here leans too heavily on the analogy with psychoanalysis: assuming that philosophical problems are all 'just' disquiets belittles the importance with which Wittgenstein treats these problems. Philosophical anxiety is *not at all* like psychological anxiety for Wittgenstein: while, to him, philosophical problems carry an intense charge, they are not pathological and are experienced very differently from psychological ones. Seeing problems as *being* disquiets raises a whole host of philosophical issues. What does Wittgenstein have to say to philosophers who do *not* suffer from philosophical anxiety, or who find philosophy a source of pleasure? If the philosopher's only goal is to treat anxieties, it seems that Wittgenstein has nothing to say to these people; but Wittgenstein claims that people can suffer from a "loss of problems"ⁿ—

⁴⁷ Wittgenstein writes: "A philosophical problem has the form: 'I don't know my way about'" (*PI* §123); "The civic status of a contradiction...that is the philosophical problem" (*PI* §125); "Philosophical problems occur when language goes on holiday" (*PI* §38). He also refers to the "philosophical problem about mental processes and states and behaviourism" (*PI* §308), a problem which is not an ordinary anxiety, but one with *philosophical content*.

philosophers *without* anxiety can also be in need of Wittgensteinian therapy, if therapy is what he offers. And finally, there simply is not sufficient textual evidence to claim that every philosophical problem is (or causes) anxiety. Furthermore, Wittgenstein typically does not refer to any anxiety whatsoever when bringing up a philosophical problem. I think it is best to say that philosophical problems can *sometimes* produce, or manifest as, anxiety; the anxiety is at most a *symptom* of the philosophical problem, not the problem itself.

(b) *Person-relativity* and (c) *the necessity of an interlocutor*. Baker claims that Wittgensteinian therapy “must take the form of a discussion with an individual... every problem is *someone’s* problem... Hence therapy for confusions is *essentially* person-relative”.^o Since therapy entails giving a talking cure, it requires an interlocutor: an analysand to be psychoanalyzed. Textually, this is a very difficult claim to argue for. Wittgenstein occasionally engages with other thinkers, for example with William James in the *PI*; but he never does so for more than a remark or two, and it is not as if Wittgenstein is *corresponding* with an actual living person. We could instead say that he is engaging the reader; however, there remains the fact that the text is *fixed*, and therefore at most *imaginatively* reader-relative. More plausible is the suggestion, which Baker does not make, that the text is a form of *self-therapy*: Wittgenstein produces the images he does because they are the ones that help *him* break free of his philosophical anxiety.⁴⁸

This suggests a reinterpretation of Baker’s claim: that Wittgenstein is, perhaps, engaging with philosophers who influenced his techniques or thinking; for example, with Russell, G.E. Moore, Augustine, or James. These will be internalized versions of their views; Wittgenstein could be constructing textual versions of people he interacted with to engage in dialogue with, or creating

⁴⁸ Cf. “The real discovery is the one that enables me to break off philosophizing when I want to. – The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring *itself* into question” (PI §133).

voices from writings or ideas he engaged with and found problematic or interesting, or articulated something he found to be a powerful or natural thought.⁴⁹

More frequently, though, Wittgenstein appears to be talking to himself, as in e.g. *PI* §141:

But what if not just the picture of the cube, but also the method of projection, comes before our mind? — How am I to imagine this? – Perhaps I see before me a schema showing the method of projection...

In these passages, there is something to be gained by employing the imaginative model of dialogue—separating two voices out of the text can make it clearer what is going on. For example, in the above quote Wittgenstein is engaging with an interlocutor who is committed to defending the idea of the ‘inner image’—but it is nonetheless a stretch to see Wittgenstein’s texts as philosophical treatments for *particular* people. Whom would he be treating, exactly? Real people, their caricatures, or himself? What happens once they are treated? It is necessary to answer these questions, but any answers would be highly conjectural. Baker falls into precisely the error he warns about: he allowed an analogy to override his thinking. The therapeutic reading is intended to simply highlight *aspects* of Wittgenstein’s text; when the reading seems to be asking us to do an unreasonable amount of imaginative or justificatory work, it risks becoming too far separated from the text, and blinds us to other aspects which this comparison-object does not capture.

(d) *The importance of unconscious pictures.* Baker’s claim is that the genesis of a philosophical problem is an unconscious ‘picture’, an analogy or way of understanding things which, when misapplied, produces philosophical anxiety. This is, in my opinion, Baker’s greatest interpretive contribution. Baker sees Wittgenstein’s method as “a form of homeopathy: a way of ‘treating’ pictures with other pictures”.^p The best evidence in favor of this claim is (1) the structure of Wittgenstein’s discussions and (2) the discussion of aspect-seeing in the *PI*, *PPF* and other later

⁴⁹ It is certainly *sometimes* possible to identify Wittgenstein’s interlocutors, e.g. Moore in *OC*.

works. The *PI* is rife with examples in which Wittgenstein refers to ‘pictures’: for example, describing a remark he has just made, Wittgenstein writes in *PI* §140:

What was the effect of my argument? It called our attention to (reminded us of) the fact that there are other processes, besides the one we originally thought of... So our ‘belief that the picture forced a particular application upon us’ consisted in the fact that only one case and no other occurred to us.

The whole form of Wittgenstein’s method, according to Baker, is “seeking for an unconscious analogy or picture, an unconscious conception or a way of seeing things”.^q He cites *PI* §402: “When... we disapprove of the expressions of ordinary language... we have got a picture in our heads which conflicts with the picture of our ordinary way of speaking”. This picture leads the philosopher to believe that “in order to convey an important insight, he is compelled to say something which seems, even to himself, empty, self-contradictory, or meaningless”.^r

The extent to which Wittgenstein’s ‘method’ is based on uprooting such ‘pictures’ is contentious, however. We should be wary of saying that *every* philosophical problem consists in misapplying an unconscious picture; furthermore, there may be different degrees of perniciousness inherent in different pictures. Wittgenstein frequently suggests that there are other things that can go wrong with thinking besides the influence ‘unconscious’ pictures. One major case is when analogies from other parts of language are used in a new, inappropriate case, even *consciously*: for example, Wittgenstein frequently cites the law of the excluded middle as a source of confusion: “...we want to quote the law of excluded middle and say: “Either such an image floats before his mind, or it does not; there is no third possibility!” ... That is to say: God sees – but we don’t know”.^s Furthermore, the source of confusion need not be unconscious: the philosopher who believes that logical rules have universal application is fully aware of what model she is using here. What is certainly true is that Wittgenstein perceives the seeing of only a *single* possibility as a danger; it is not necessary, *contra* Baker, however, that the source of confusion be an ‘unconscious picture’.

Baker connects these claims to Wittgenstein's discussion of aspect-seeing: "[Wittgenstein] attempts to reveal *aspects* of things that are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity".^t Having an unconscious picture is like continuously seeing only one aspect of a picture (e.g. only the duck in a duck-rabbit), and what Wittgenstein's therapy does, according to Baker, is show us alternative aspects. This claim perceptively mirrors the structure of many passages of Wittgenstein,⁵⁰ and its insight is separable from the more contentious parts of the interpretation; I intend to return to it in developing my own way of reading Wittgenstein in the next chapter.

(e) *Prejudices* and (f) *Motives*. Baker claims that the presence of the unconscious picture places the philosopher in "the grip of specific prejudices",^u leading them to make dogmatic claims: "The patient holds that every proposition *must* be a complete picture of a state of affairs, that every proposition *must* be composite",^v and so on. Inevitably, this picture meets resistance: the world, or all of language or thought, does not 'fit' it. The philosopher becomes dogmatic when she *insists* that her unconscious picture *must* be correct, despite appearances to the contrary. So, for example, the person who insists that sensations *must* be inner objects, because every word must have a referent, finds that they encounter conceptual difficulty when trying to explicate the resulting view; nonetheless, she insists that, if sensation-names can be used in language, they *must* have referents.⁵¹ One's motive for saying something odd and philosophical is the irresistible grip of the picture which "[holds] us captive".^w Baker writes that "thinkers are prey to the illusion that [nonsensical] propositions [which they are tempted to assert because of their unconscious picture] say things of fundamental importance";^x philosophers feel motivated to apply their unconscious picture because it seems, to them, to say something profound, when in fact it is simply nonsense.

⁵⁰ For example, *PI* §140 as cited above.

⁵¹ Compare Malcolm's proponent of private language, who wraps himself up in all kinds of paradoxes because he refuses to shift from his mistaken way of asking how language is related to inner sensations.

The dogma is simply the temptation to insist, “this is how it *has to be!*”:⁵² like the claim about unconscious pictures, this is insightful and worth recognizing in any reading. On Baker’s view, a dogma might be called “an entrenched aspect”:^y Wittgenstein seeks to loosen the hold of a singular aspect by demonstrating other possible aspects. Thus aspects “are essentially plural”.^z Wittgenstein’s business “in ‘describing grammar’... is making neglected aspects or conceptions visible to others who are blind to what is in full view”.^{aa}

A great deal of textual evidence stands in favor of this claim. We might consider *PI* §129:

The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something – because it is always before one’s eyes.) ... we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.

The dogma stands between the philosopher and the truth like a kind of blindness: it makes her incapable of seeing the way things actually stand. To eliminate the dogma, it is necessary to show the philosopher what she has been unable to see because of the dogma’s overriding influence. Thus, Wittgenstein writes in *PI* §132:

We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order for a particular purpose, one out of many possible orders, not *the* order. For this purpose we shall again and again *emphasize* distinctions which our ordinary forms of language easily make us overlook.

These orderings, which Baker takes to be the ‘descriptions of grammar’ that Wittgenstein frequently alludes to,⁵³ will, when effective, produce the recognition that one way of looking at things is not the *only* way of looking at things. And this newly discovered way of looking at things is much like the lighting up of an aspect in that what it reveals was there all along.

(g) *Freedom*. Once cured, the sufferer gains freedom from a particular picture or aspect. A picture had been a self-imposed restriction “on the individual’s freedom of intellectual

⁵² *PI* §112: “‘But *this* isn’t how it is!’ – we say. ‘Yet *this* is how it *has to be!*’”

⁵³ Another type of comparison-object or ‘perspicuous representation’.

movement”.^{bb} Once the “bondage in which one analogy holds us [has] been broken by placing another [analogy] alongside which we acknowledge to be equally justified”^{cc} we are free from the anxiety, and therefore out of the grip of the philosophical problem. The philosopher, by being exposed to new pictures, has been freed from the restricting frame of the unconscious picture. However, Baker leaves what exactly the philosopher does *after* she has been freed unclear. At times, Wittgenstein himself seems to speak as if one is free to no longer do *philosophy*: “The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. — The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question”.^{dd} This suggests, to quietist readers, that Wittgenstein has as his goal the *complete* elimination of philosophy. However, the context of this remark is often misrepresented: this remark is immediately followed by, “Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples; and the series of examples can be broken off”.^{ee} Wittgenstein has turned from one “philosophical method”^{ff} to another: for Baker, the work of the philosopher thus becomes wholly therapeutic, devoted to curing the sufferers of philosophical problems; a task which may be interminable, and which is dependent upon the continued existence of sufferers of philosophical problems.

I think it is fair to say that psychoanalysis, as a comparison-object, effectively highlights *some* aspects of Wittgenstein’s texts, but is nonetheless of limited usefulness. I am sympathetic to points (d), (e), and (f) of Baker, that is, the importance of unconscious, unexamined pictures in forming dogmatic viewpoints; however, I am unsympathetic to the claims which serve to *overemphasize* the alignment with Freud. These claims are products of exactly the overextension of analogies Wittgenstein often strenuously combats: When we try to make the *wrong* application of a picture, to overextend its use, we are prone to *impose* that picture on things. It is insisting on too much to claim that Wittgensteinian therapy is directed at specific (perhaps identifiable)

interlocutors, and that all the method intends to do is reduce their anxiety (if being punched reduced their anxiety, would we say their philosophical anxiety had been cured?).⁵⁴

1.4 Kuusela and the Struggle against Dogmatism

Oskari Kuusela, in his book *The Struggle Against Dogmatism*, takes up one of Baker's most important ideas and centralizes it: for Kuusela, the Wittgenstein's goal is to "avoid metaphysical projections and dogmatism".^a Like his teacher Gordon Baker, Kuusela believes that this means taking extremely seriously Wittgenstein's stated intention to create a philosophical approach "that does not involve philosophical doctrines, theses, or theories"^b and aims to "obtain *flexibility* in philosophical thought *without loss of rigor*".^c Kuusela agrees with the late Baker in seeing in the traditional readers a kind of dogmatism: the claim that there could be *one*, final analysis of language, that is, that there is a single, explicable structure underlying our language. However, like Malcolm and many other traditional interpreters, Kuusela sees Wittgenstein's goal as being to clarify our concepts, to dissolve philosophical problems which result from "misunderstandings concerning 'the uses of words' or 'workings of language'".^{55, d}

For Kuusela, it is central to Wittgenstein's later philosophy that there cannot be a *single* depiction of the logic of our language. Local descriptions of language, particularly examples of rules and language games, are to be used *only* as comparison-objects, as "[modes] of presentation" for language-use,^e or as means by which "fluctuating uses" of language can "be studied by comparing them to something more fixed".^f Kuusela foregrounds these in his account, arguing that

⁵⁴ Russell apparently at one time had a theory of desire which stated that, by definition, whatever was desired was what caused the cessation of the desire-feeling. "Russell's theory, Wittgenstein said, amounted to this: if I give someone an order and what he does pleases me, then he has carried out the order. But this would be as foolish as to say that if I wanted to eat an apple and somebody gave me a punch in the stomach which took away my appetite, it was this punch which I had really wanted all along" (Kenny 100).

⁵⁵ Cf. fn 24, regarding Hacker and Baker's idea of clarification.

[Philosophical] problems arise when [an example's] applicability is claimed to be greater than it actually is, in particular when the example is claimed to show something that is *necessarily* true of the cases it concerns.⁵⁶

Misunderstood examples, for Kuusela, can be a major source of philosophical problems, and thus understanding how Wittgenstein approaches his own examples will be an important part of Kuusela's understanding of Wittgenstein. Like Baker, Kuusela focuses on the philosopher's tendency to take one image or analogy and *overextend* it.⁵⁶ The cure for dogmatism is thus to demonstrate that this example is just *one* example, that it has a limited applicability and should be thought of as merely 'an object of comparison'.

It is useful, in understanding Kuusela, to explore in what ways his reading differs from Baker's, since this will throw light on both interpretations. We can think of Kuusela as endorsing Baker's points (d), (e), and (f): for him, a philosopher's task is the identification of an entrenched picture which has led to misunderstanding, and the demonstration that this picture is not the only viable one; this realization leads to the dissolution of the philosophical problem which it caused. He thus de-emphasizes Baker's reliance on psychoanalysis as the comparison-object to the point at which it becomes clear that valuable aspects of Baker's interpretation do not require this analogy.⁵⁷ In particular, he explicitly rejects the idea that Wittgenstein's philosophy constitutes *person-centered* therapy. In his view, the objects of Wittgensteinian therapy are perfectly general tendencies of thinking "that lead to the adoption of... problematic conceptions"^h. Kuusela sees these tendencies as giving rise to traditional philosophical problems, which, in his view and *contra* Baker's, Wittgenstein takes on. An important example is the traditional problem of other minds:

In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein... [explains] the failure of the "analogy theory" as a solution to the problem of other minds, according to which

⁵⁶ However, unlike Baker, he does not connect this impulse or Wittgenstein's methods to psychoanalysis.

⁵⁷ It is noteworthy that Kuusela spends only four pages of a very long book explicitly discussing the idea of philosophy as therapy.

my knowledge of others' sensations is based on the assumption of an analogy between me and them. Thus, one might say on the basis of the analogy theory:⁵⁸ "Her pain is the same or a similar sensation as I sometimes have." ... What is lacking in the pain case... is a criterion of sameness for my and the other person's pain, which is required for the explanation "She has the same pain as I" to work.ⁱ

Kuusela sees Wittgenstein as showing the failure of a proposed solution to the problem of other minds, namely "the argument from analogy." Instead of seeking a solution to the problem of other minds, Wittgenstein, in Kuusela's interpretation, offers a kind of therapy: "to release a person from the grip of... the misleading pictures that hold her thought in a cramp".^j The philosopher does this by showing the person that they, in fact, *cannot* say what they want to say: their anxiety presupposes a criterion of sameness for their pain and others, which is exactly what they deny.⁵⁹ In one sense, this is like Baker's therapy: the philosopher addresses one person and shows them how their thinking has gone wrong. However, the attribution of the philosophical problem to philosophical "tendencies of thinking" produces a tension in Kuusela's account. Because Kuusela sees Wittgenstein as trying to address traditional philosophical arguments, he ends up attributing underlying, logical structure to Wittgenstein's texts, just as the traditional interpreters did. Kuusela wants it both ways: the genesis of the problems is broad, philosophical or other 'dispositions' of thought, but they are treated as if they are a specific individual's problem.

Like the later Baker (and *contra* the early Baker and Hacker), Kuusela believes that this is not achieved by seeing "the correct order of concepts"—there is no such thing. Rather, the goal is

⁵⁸ Bertrand Russell famously explains the argument from analogy this way: "The behavior of other people is in many ways analogous to our own, and we suppose that it must have analogous causes. What people say is what we should say if we had certain thoughts, and so we infer that they probably have these thoughts. They give us information which we can sometimes subsequently verify. They behave in ways in which we behave when we are pleased (or displeased) in circumstances in which we should be pleased (or displeased). We may talk over with a friend some incident which we have both experienced, and find that his reminiscences dovetail with our own; this is particularly convincing when he remembers something that we have forgotten but that he recalls to our thoughts... There are, in short, very many ways in which my responses to stimuli differ from those of "dead" matter, and in all these ways other people resemble me. As it is clear to me that the causal laws governing my behavior have to do with "thoughts," it is natural to infer that the same is true of the analogous behavior of my friends" (Russell 482).

⁵⁹ Essentially, this is the same as Malcolm's account.

to achieve a sort of ‘local’ clarity by getting the philosopher “to look at things in a particular way”.^k *Particular* orders of concepts are established “with a particular end in view”^l—that of dissolving a particular philosophical problem. What distinguishes Kuusela’s interpretation from Baker’s is his focus on *examples* and *rules*, and their use in clarifying ‘our language’. Kuusela believes that Wittgenstein’s primary set of comparison-objects are clear, logically precise and artificially constructed rules and language-games: “Philosophy... uses clear and precise rules as a mode of presentation in describing and clarifying the use of language”.^m The point of these comparison-objects is still ‘clarificatory’: exact rules are used to articulate models of language-use to which actual uses of language may be compared. The rule is like “a measuring rod used for describing certain characteristics of an object of investigation”.ⁿ Kuusela cites MS 140, written in 1934:

If we look at the actual use of a word, what we see is something constantly fluctuating.

In our investigations we set over [and] against this fluctuation something more fixed, just as one paints a stationary picture of a constantly altering landscape.^o

Kuusela gives an example using the famous remark “*Essence* is expressed by grammar”:^p “Wittgenstein’s position... [is that] the concept of grammar does not explain what makes something essential or necessary, but questions about essences and necessities can be clarified by way of grammatical observations”.^q The distinction here appears to be this: Wittgenstein is not *actually* making any claims about essences or necessity, but rather providing us with a tool useful for solving problems caused by mistaken ideas about essence: think about essence as expressed by grammar. The question is one of the *modality* of the statement: it is tempting to take a sentence like “grammar is essence” as expressing a necessary truth, when it is only a contingently useful comparison-object. By comparing a strict rule such as ‘all words have referents’ to our fluctuating language-use, for example, we come to see that, in fact, many words do *not* have referents.

It is important to note that almost all of Kuusela’s evidence for his claims about the use of

rules come from the *Blue and Brown Books*, compiled from student notes between 1933-5.

Kuusela, rather unconvincingly, cites *PI* §§76-7 as later versions of this thought:

If someone wanted to draw a sharp boundary, I couldn't acknowledge it as the one that I too always wanted to draw, or had drawn in my mind. For I didn't want to draw one at all. The affinity is that of two pictures, one of which consists of colour patches with blurred boundaries and the other of patches similarly shaped and distributed but with sharp boundaries. The affinity is just as undeniable as the difference.¹

Kuusela says that Wittgenstein is discussing “the method of clarification with rules as objects of comparison”:⁵ as we have seen, the method of comparing our actual language-use against logically exact rules in order to see the logic of our language more clearly. But Wittgenstein's remark, rather than expressing the *necessity* or usefulness of setting a ‘fixed’ picture over a static one, instead states that such a fixed image cannot really *reveal* anything that was already there: it is simply a *new* picture, which may or may not have some affinity with the original, blurred picture. Wittgenstein *explicitly* states in these remarks that looking for a ‘fixed’ picture in the blurry one is like looking for a rigid definition in a blurry conceptual landscape: what is at issue is not the use of a fixed comparison-object, but the impossibility and uselessness of finding a rigid definition.

However, Kuusela's reading is instructive in several ways. First, he provides a good example of how to apply some of Baker's insights *without* overextending the psychoanalytic comparison-object: his reading preserves what is distinctive and valuable in Baker's reading, namely, the focus on comparison-objects and changing someone's way of looking at a philosophical problem. In doing so, he pinpoints what seems to be one of the *most* important features of Wittgenstein's thought: its hostility to dogmatism in all forms. Kuusela sees Wittgenstein's main target as metaphysical dogmatism, and, in formulating Wittgenstein's approach to combating it, gives us an extremely useful conceptual framework:

... the metaphysical projection [Kuusela's term for metaphysical theory-building]

may in some cases be described as the conferral of the characteristics of a *prototype* upon the object of investigation. A prototype here is a paradigmatic or exemplary case on which other cases may be modeled, and which, in this capacity, forms a basis for a way of conceiving those cases and a mode of presenting them. The metaphysical projection, however, constitutes a more ambitious use of the prototype... Now the prototype is claimed to be something that the objects of investigation *must* match.^t

This is a paradigmatic case of a philosophical problem for Kuusela. A philosopher takes something which is meant to be an example, and (1) overextends its applicability, (2) sees it as necessarily true of all cases when it is merely meant as an example, and (3) fails to recognize that it makes sense as an example only within a particular context. This perceptively explicates the connection Baker sees between antidogmatism broadly and the focus on individual examples. This is a very important insight, as it helps explain how Wittgenstein's larger aims might be connected to his constant insistence on dealing with particular problems in specific contexts: because Kuusela demonstrates that particular problems can arise from certain philosophical tendencies of thought, Wittgenstein can address traditional philosophical problems in specific cases.

The second potential virtue of Kuusela's reading is the way in which it considers a particular family of cases of philosophical confusions and their treatment. Baker does not focus as heavily on cases involving the use and misuse of rules. Kuusela's perceptive treatment of this subject, a favorite of traditional interpreters, could perhaps bridge the gap between Baker's philosophy-as-therapy and traditional readers' conceptual analysis. These two approaches seem to tug in two highly different and, as we have seen, dangerous directions. Kuusela is thus aiming to perform a delicate tightrope act, exposed to the danger of falling off one way or the other. When he does so, however, it is also instructive: perhaps the gap between the traditional and post-traditional interpreters of Wittgenstein cannot really be bridged.

To see why, let's return to his elliptical treatment of the other-minds skeptic. He sees

Wittgenstein's approach in the *PI* to be largely the same as that found in the *Blue Book*:

Although it may appear that the metaphysician has made a discovery about pain [namely that I should restrict the use of the word 'pain' to my own case, the only one about which I am certain], she is in effect making a suggestion concerning language use—as her rule denying the reality of other's pain incidentally deviates from the common use of the word "pain".^u

Kuusela is referring to Wittgenstein's comment that, if the skeptic wants to restrict the word "pain" to only her own case, and refer to everyone else's pain-behavior or presumed pains by some other locution, such as by saying, "X is behaving the way I do when I am in pain", then the skeptic is not really generating any doubts about our concepts and beliefs; rather, he is merely making an idiosyncratic proposal for a redefinition of the word "pain".⁶⁰ But because Kuusela introduces a discrepancy in the skeptic's *logic* and that of our language, he is at risk of falling off the tightrope.

Nowhere is this more evident than in his remarks on the status of rules. On the one hand, Kuusela argues that rules are to be used merely as comparison-objects, against which and in terms of which discussion of particular philosophical problems may be framed. But on the other hand, he claims (1) that these rules "[capture]... aspects of [a] concept"^v and therefore (2), *contra* Baker, he believes that *enumerating* different rules-as-comparison-objects can give a more *complete* picture of a concept: that is, by proliferating comparison-objects, each of which captures one feature of the logic of that concept, we can approach a complete list of that concept's features, or a complete accounting of its logic. Thus, for example, he states that Wittgenstein proposes "two aspects of the concept of language: (1) language as analogous to games and defined by strict rules and (2) language as analogous to instruments".^w So far, there is no problem with either of these:

⁶⁰ "Now the man whom we call a solipsist and who says that only his own experiences are real, does not thereby disagree with us about any practical question of fact, he does not say that we are simulating when we complain of pains... For he would say that it was *inconceivable* that experiences other than his own were real. He ought therefore to use a notation in which such a phrase as "A has real toothache" (where A is not he) is meaningless... The solipsist's suggestion comes to using such a phrase as "there is real toothache" instead of "Smith (the solipsist) has toothache". And why shouldn't we grant him this notation? (BB 59).

we have two kinds of representation of how language works, which might be useful in different situations. However, Kuusela then immediately treats language as something with sufficient and necessary properties for membership, given by these two aspects. For example, “Boo!” counts as a word because it satisfies (2): it is analogous to an instrument, because we can use it to scare someone. Thus, he treats having either of these aspects as *sufficient* for being a word, and having one or the other (or another of presumably specifiable rules) as *necessary* for being a word.

For Kuusela, then, an ‘aspect’ is like a territory of thought with its own local geography and rules; by conjoining many of these territories though different aspects, we start to get a fuller view of the terrain. The goal is a definitive, complete picture of a domain of thought or language – precariously close to the traditional interpreters’ assumption that W’s philosophy offers a theories, positions and solutions to familiar philosophical problem. Kuusela makes this position even clearer in his recent paper “Gordon Baker on the Non-additivity of Philosophical Conceptions vs. The Possibility of Multidimensional Logical Descriptions”. There, he claims that, “contrary to Baker’s account of the grammar of Wittgensteinian conceptions [aspects], it is possible to combine different conceptions into more comprehensive accounts”.^x Kuusela believes that, by allowing Wittgenstein’s remarks to get at the real logical geography of our concepts, he *avoids* attributing theses to Wittgenstein; he says that he attributes merely local descriptions of ‘logic’ to him.⁶¹ This is the point at which he falls off the tightrope: “Logic... is there *in the use of language* to be described correctly or incorrectly, and it is in this sense something real and complete”.^y He thus falls back into attributing to Wittgenstein *actual theses* about ‘logic’, which Kuusela has equated with grammar. This, and his yearning for completeness, is precisely what links Kuusela’s approach to the earlier traditional interpreters of Wittgenstein. There is a tension between these tendencies

⁶¹ Oddly, Kuusela argues that *not* allowing that multiple aspects can be combined into a comprehensive account is tantamount to slipping back into a traditional reading, which he wants to avoid.

and what Kuusela says in other places about the use of examples. Examples are *for a purpose*; similarly, descriptions of language or orderings of concepts are for a purpose, and any of these orders is “not *the* order”.² Kuusela, like Baker, has enshrined a particular comparison-object: rules, which will, through comparison, show us the *singular* logic of our language. They are singular because, if a number of aspects can add up to a *unified* picture or set of uses or rules, the possibility of two local rules being *incompatible* has been ruled out. But if we look at any reasonably common word, we will see that many of its uses are mutually exclusive. It doesn’t give us a more complete picture of ‘our language’ to know that “We saw her duck” can be read in at least three different ways, all of which are mutually exclusive (We saw a duck that belonged to her, we saw her duck to avoid something, we cut up her duck with a saw). Instead, the ‘aspects’ of this sentence are *locally exclusive*: the sentence may be taken in several ways, but only in one way at a time.

Although Kuusela’s interpretive project ultimately fails, unable to overcome its internal inconsistency, it is still useful in providing an example of a possible way of combining the valuable aspects of Baker’s later interpretation without accepting Baker’s more problematic claims about the analogy to psychoanalysis; by insisting on the antidogmatic goals of Wittgenstein’s approach, it provides a jumping-off point for a reading which seeks to expand upon Baker’s.

CHAPTER 2: A MULTIFACETED READING

In the course of my discussion of extant interpretive approaches, I hope to have highlighted five things: (1), the weaknesses of traditional readings, that is, the problems arising from treating Wittgenstein's texts as typical philosophical texts; (2) the failure of quietist readings to resist dogmatic claims; (3) the many valuable aspects of the therapeutic approach, but also the potential danger in (4) overextending the psychoanalytic analogy and (5) insisting on a singular therapeutic approach. If we take these lessons to heart, the resulting interpretation will owe many debts to Baker, and will in many senses be intelligible as a reaction to his and Kuusela's work.

These five points give us the desiderata for a new interpretive approach which will attempt to take Wittgenstein's text on its own terms, resist attributing metaphilosophical quietism, expand upon the most valuable aspects of the therapeutic reading, and regard itself as a possibility, as one lens, among others. I am therefore advocating, at the meta-interpretive level, a pluralistic conception of what constitutes an acceptable interpretation. That is, in doing interpretive work on Wittgenstein's texts, there are many potentially useful comparison-objects which might be brought to bear, each of which is of limited use. Baker's approach highlights the comparison-object of Freudian psychotherapy, an insight which is productive in many ways; however, Baker often overplays his hand by insisting that this comparison-object has a definitive status. What I am trying to avoid is *insisting* that a particular way of organizing the text is the *only correct* one: different comparison-objects will highlight different aspects of what is a complex text with many such aspects.

2.1 *The Change of Aspect*

In this section and what follows, I will advance an interpretive position which takes as its guiding comparison-object Wittgenstein's discussion of *seeing an aspect*. I want to be clear at the beginning of this section that this discussion is, like Baker's when he is being careful, intended to demonstrate a *possibility*: within the space of the five constraints I have given above, *many* different aspects of the text could be emphasized. I have chosen *one* to focus on here, because I think it is particularly productive, and because the strands of the analogy at its heart can be found all over the landscape of Wittgenstein's philosophy and its reception, including in Baker's own reading.

Let us briefly return to aspect-seeing as I understand it. When one sees a new aspect, one both *does* and *does not* see the same image as before: "The expression of a change of aspect is an expression of a *new* perception and, at the same time, an expression of an unchanged perception";^a "The head seen in *this* way hasn't even the slightest similarity to the head seen in *that* way — although they are congruent".^b In some ways, seeing an aspect is like perceiving an interpretation: it is *one* way of taking a picture that might be taken multiple ways. This is also a helpful comparison, because it clarifies that the 'aspect' is *not* a 'new object', a separate mental image from the original picture: it is like a way of organizing the visual impression.⁶²

"I suddenly see the solution of a puzzle-picture. Where there were previously branches, now there is a human figure. My visual impression has changed, and now I recognize that it has not only shape and colour, but also a quite particular 'organization'. — My visual impression has changed — what was it like before; what is it like now? If I represent it by means of an exact copy — and isn't that a good representation of it? — no change shows up."^c

⁶² The organization is not a separate entity from the picture: "Someone who puts the 'organization' of a visual impression on a level with colours and shapes would be taking it for granted that the visual impression is an inner object. Of course, this makes this object chimerical, a strangely vacillating entity. For the similarity to a picture is now impaired" (PPF xi §134). But the organization is not something one can point at, separately from pointing at the picture (in this way, it is like an inner image, as we will see later). It is a *way of construing* a picture.

If someone asks, “What are you seeing?”, all one can do is point at the drawing—one can’t very well point at the way one *sees* the drawing, the ‘inner image’ in one’s mind, and even if one could, it would be congruent to the drawing!⁶³ But it *is* possible to find out what someone sees the duck-rabbit as: “If I saw the duck-rabbit as a rabbit, then I saw such-and-such shapes and colours... and, in addition, I saw something like this: and here I point to a great variety of pictures of rabbits”.^d

The aspect is a way of seeing the image, not anything separable from the image itself.

In another sense, seeing an aspect of an image is a way of *reacting* to it:

[A] triangle can be seen as a triangular hole, a solid, as a geometrical drawing; as standing on its base, as hanging from its apex; as a mountain...^e

A triangle can really be *standing up* in one picture, hanging in another, and in a third represent something fallen over – in such a way that I, who am looking at it, say, not “It may also represent something fallen over”, but “That glass has fallen over and is lying there in fragments”. This is how we react to the picture.^f

The person who sees a different aspect from me *reacts* to the picture differently: when shown the duck-rabbit, she exclaims “Ah! A duck!” rather than my “Ah! A rabbit!”. We may react to a face depicted in a painting the same way we react to a real one: “I say: ‘We view a portrait as a human being’ – when do we do so, and for how long? *Always*, if we see it at all”.^g But we may also see it as a flat concretion of paint.⁶⁴

Near the beginning of the section spanning roughly *PI* §§89-133, which contains remarks about the practice of philosophy, Wittgenstein writes:

One person might say, “A proposition is the most ordinary thing in the world”, and another, “A proposition – that’s something very remarkable!” — And the latter is unable simply to look and see how propositions work. For the forms of the

⁶³ “And above all do not say ‘Surely, my visual impression isn’t the *drawing*; it is *this* — which I can’t show to anyone.’ Of course, it is not the drawing; but neither is it something of the same category, which I carry within myself” (*PI* §132). Furthermore, one’s visual impression, if there were such a thing, would be a copy of the figure; and no copy of the figure can demonstrate the organization according to which one is seeing the figure.

⁶⁴ We may also see it as a picture of an individual human, a fictional character, as someone we know, as a map of a very strange territory, as an abstract piece, as the surface of a table, as part of a wall, as a distribution of colors on a surface...

expressions we use in talking about propositions and thought stand in his way. [...] *A misunderstanding* makes it look to us as if a proposition *did* something strange.^h

A proposition, which is something ordinary, is seen through a lens which makes it seem mysterious: how do our words relate to something beyond ourselves? Isn't it a remarkable fact that we can reach out with language and make contact with the world? But the person who thinks this is something remarkable is misled by our "forms of expression": to him the sentence "This is how things are" seems almost mystical, but he fails to see that the sentence is standing in for a proposition and might as easily be represented by a propositional variable like "p", which doesn't seem mysterious at all.ⁱ The "forms of the expressions we use" stand between him and clarity of vision like an obscuring lens.

In the next remark, Wittgenstein makes it clear that *seeing* and *looking* are guiding metaphors for what goes wrong when someone is under the spell of a particular form of expression: "our forms of expression, which send us in pursuit of chimeras, prevent us in all sorts of ways from seeing that nothing extraordinary is involved".^j The form of expression is what Baker called 'a picture': a way of talking that gives us a particular picture of the way things are, and through which and using which we think, speak, and experience the world. The picture of the two realms, the inner and the outer one, is one such example: a picture which regulates a whole field of other pictures, acting like a center of gravity which bends thought around itself.

When held in the grip of a picture, one is experiencing a certain kind of blindness, and this blindness is like that of the person who is blind to an aspect:⁶⁵

The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something – because it is always before one's eyes.) The real foundations of their inquiry do not strike people at all. Unless *that* fact has at some time struck them. – And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.^k

⁶⁵ An example of someone who is blind to an aspect would be someone who can see only the rabbit in a duck-rabbit.

When we see a new aspect of something, it is like being struck—something seems to emerge before our eyes which was never there before. But, in fact, what is *there* has not changed—we are simply looking at it in it new way. So, nothing has changed, and yet, everything has changed: “The head [of the duck-rabbit] seen in *this* way hasn’t even the slightest similarity to the head seen in *that* way—although they are congruent”.¹ It is not that the *figure* of the duck-rabbit has changed, although something different is *seen* each time.

The point of Wittgenstein’s texts is to produce a change in the way we conceptualize the philosophical problem which is akin to the change of aspect: and this change in aspect allows us to give up the idea that the way we had been conceiving of the problem was *necessarily* the *only* way of doing so. Thus, the new aspect gives us a new possibility for *structuring our thought*, by means of which the problem might be dissolved. The change of aspect releases us from the hold of all-consuming pictures and definitions, and allows our thinking to proceed *without* the felt need for dogmatism, systematization, and rigid definition. By recognizing an aspect *as* an aspect—not the exact, singularly possible representation of a concept, or word, or language, but as one representation among others—the problems caused by overstating the importance of a single aspect,⁶⁶ seeing only a single aspect as possible,⁶⁷ and trying to use that same aspect to represent an inappropriate concept⁶⁸ can be solved.

2.2 *Knowing People Inside and Out*

One of the key concerns of the *Investigations* and the *Philosophy of Psychology: A Fragment* is the idea of the mind as a ‘secret realm’, full of hidden processes and objects: private

⁶⁶ The question of the *scope* of a representation: are all sentences propositions?

⁶⁷ The question of modality: is it a *necessary* truth that propositions are true or false?

⁶⁸ The question of context: what proposition is expressed by “Hi there!”?

pictures^a and experiences,^b sensations (e.g. pain),^c and so on. Underlying this conception is the dualistic picture of the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ parts of a person—that is, the mind (or psyche), and the body—which generates the view of mental states and processes as ‘inner’. To the dualist, objects are divided into two fundamentally different kinds: “inner” objects inside of the mind, and “external” objects in the physical world. Because the obvious connection between these two realms is notoriously difficult to articulate, the distinction between “inner” and “outer” generates traditional skeptical problems, including the so-called *problem of other minds*: given that we have immediate, direct and incorrigible access to our own mental states, but observe only others’ behavior, how could we ever know that anyone else has such states, and if they do, how can we know what exactly other people are experiencing at any given moment?

Wittgenstein’s remarks can be thought of as addressing the skeptical problem of other minds by problematizing mind/body dualism in at least three distinct ways.⁶⁹ The first might be thought of as a series of *logical* points: Wittgenstein offers examples of phenomena which do not fit easily into either the category of ‘inner’ or ‘outer’, problematizing the dualistic idea of a clear distinction between these two types of objects. The second can be thought of as an *ontological* point: Wittgenstein challenges the dualist by showing how misguided it is to think of mental states and processes as “internal objects.” This leads to the third, *epistemic* point: Wittgenstein shows that we, in fact, often *do* have unproblematic knowledge of other people’s mental states. We will examine each of these points in turn.

⁶⁹ This categorization is intended *only* to allow us to more easily see different aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophical work. Wittgenstein himself does not offer these categories, and these categories are neither exhaustive—many kinds of challenges are raised in the text—nor definitive. Furthermore, he does not categorize his remarks in such a way that they relate easily to the traditional philosophical categories I use here; I present these therefore only as a useful way of distinguishing parts of the text.

2.21 No Sharp Boundaries

One of the claims made by someone with a dualistic picture is that inner and outer objects and processes are logically distinct entities: that is, things belong either to the inner realm or the outer one but not to both. Wittgenstein challenges this conception by providing examples of things which don't seem to fit neatly into either the category of 'inner' or 'outer', or seem to problematize the idea of the boundary between them:

Is calculating in the head less real than calculating on paper? – One is, perhaps, inclined to say some such thing; but one can get oneself to think the opposite as well by telling oneself: paper, ink, and so on are only logical constructions out of our sense-data.^a

The person who thinks of calculating on paper as “more real” is taking this sort of calculation to be logically prior to—and therefore distinct from— “calculating in the head”. However, Wittgenstein says, it is possible to imagine this logical relation being *flipped*. There is a temptation to ask which process—the inner one of mental arithmetic, or the outer, physical one of scribbling on paper—is ‘really’ calculating—but it is possible to view either the inner or outer calculation as logically prior. It is possible to multiply both ‘in one’s head’ and ‘on paper’, and, in fact, to do the *same* calculation both ways. One can even silently “calculate on one’s fingers,” thereby involving physical movements:^b is *that* an inner process, or an outer one? Like anything else, calculating must be *either* ‘really inner’ or ‘really outer,’ according to a dualist; but in some cases, it seems to be neither, or both.⁷⁰

Wittgenstein also offers examples in which we would be tempted to apply an ‘inner’ concept based on ‘outer’ criteria: this is the point of his famous remark on pain-behavior:

How do words *refer* to sensations? – There doesn’t seem to be any problem here; don’t we talk about sensations every day, and name them? But how is the connection between the name and the thing named set up?... For example, of the

⁷⁰ The dualist might object that calculating is, in fact, always inner, yet might still be communicated to others or translated into physical marks; this will be challenged by Wittgenstein’s ontological points.

word “pain”. Here is one example: words are connected with the primitive, natural, expressions of sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences.^c

Both inner and outer descriptions of pain are being used: just as in the case of calculating, it seems that it is possible to describe pain, which seemed to be describable *only* in inner terms, in terms of something ‘outer’. The child has hurt himself and he cries—that is enough to teach the child the meaning of ‘pain’. We are given only *situational* and *behavioral* information—and yet we easily see that this is a case of pain. Even in such a paradigmatic case of an ‘inner sensation’, there are typical ‘outer’ manifestations of its presence. It is possible to think of *these* as the logically important parts of the concept of pain. In this way, both the mastery and competent use of ‘pain’ require straddling ‘the inner’ and ‘the outer’, to the point that this distinction may not appear to be useful at all.

The dualist might respond by saying that describing what is obviously an inner process in terms of outer behavior is simply *wrong*—as a matter of logic, we should carefully distinguish assertions which deal with the ‘inner’ from those which deal with the ‘outer’. But why should we do this? As a matter of fact, we constantly vacillate between inner and outer descriptions, often haphazardly:

It seems paradoxical to us that in a single report we should make such a medley, mixing physical states and states of consciousness up together: “He suffered great torments and tossed about restlessly.” It is quite usual; so why does it seem paradoxical to us? Because we want to say that the sentence is about both tangibles and intangibles. – But does it worry you if I say: “These three struts give the building stability?” Are three and stability tangible?^d

It is very difficult to keep ‘tangibles’ and ‘intangibles’ logically apart—the realms of the inner and outer just are not as neatly separated as the dualist wants to believe. His suffering is something inner, and his tossing something outer—and yet, we would regard his tossing not only as *proof*

that he was suffering, but as an aspect of his suffering (just as we would regard the three struts as part of what makes the building stable).

Furthermore, things which are supposed to fall into the category of inner states and processes do not, themselves, form a logically unified category. On the dualist's conception, there is a kind of *unity* to mental states: all mental processes are goings-on inside of the mind. Some of these are caused by 'external', and some by 'internal' processes; but there is no ontological distinction. However, mental processes in fact have important dissimilarities among themselves:

“Understanding a word”: a state. But a *mental* state? – We call dejection, excitement, pain, mental states. Carry out a grammatical investigation as follows: we say

“He felt dejected the whole day”

“He was in great excitement the whole day”

“He has been in pain uninterruptedly since yesterday”. –

We also say, “Since yesterday I have understood this word.” ‘Uninterruptedly’, though? – To be sure, one can speak of an interruption of understanding. But in what cases? Compare: “When did your pains get less?” and “When did you stop understanding that word?”^e

Understanding, for example, is importantly *not like* excitement, pain, or dejection in that it isn't usually spoken of as having a duration. There are many differences here which are covered up if we simply refer to all of these very different things as mental states.

All of these remarks have as their target the clear boundaries established by the dualist's logical distinctions. Wittgenstein, by both problematizing the border between the inner and the outer and denying the coherence of the category of the inner, chips away at these logical boundaries, pointing out their true blurriness.

2.22 What are Inner Objects, Really?

A dualist sees a sharp ontological distinction, corresponding to the logical one, between inner and outer objects. In problematizing the logical distinction, Wittgenstein is already

problematizing the dualistic ontology of everyday physical objects and mysterious, hidden objects of the mind. One of Wittgenstein's objections is to the intuition that it seems necessary for "pain" to gain its meaning by referring to a particular sensation, namely, pain. Thus, it is telling that, in giving a possible explanation for the meaning of 'pain', Wittgenstein makes *no* reference to a connection between a child's *sensation* of pain and the teaching of the word; the word might, in fact, be taught to the child purely on the basis of behavior. It seems as if we don't *need* the 'inner object' to explain the way we use the word 'pain', or the way we act towards people who are in pain:

A doctor asks: "How is he feeling?" The nurse says: "He is groaning." A report on his behavior. But need there be any question, for the two of them, whether the groaning is really genuine, is really the expression of anything? Might they not, for example, draw the conclusion "If he groans, we must give him more analgesic"—without supposing a middle term? Isn't what counts the service to which they put the description of behavior?"^a

While the doctor and nurse are clearly dealing with someone who is in pain (notice that the word "pain" wasn't even used here!), it is nowhere *necessary* to suppose an 'inner object'—or even a sensation—to explain the behavior of the doctor, the nurse, or the patient, or to explain what is going on. Wittgenstein has already problematized the *distinction* between the 'inner' and the 'outer'—now, he is making use of this point in showing us that it is not necessary to posit the 'inner' in order to explain, for example, pain and pain-behavior.

That is, Wittgenstein is getting us to see that it is often *unnecessary* to posit the existence of inner objects and processes: the dualist's ontology is not *forced* upon us:

Don't all experiences of understanding get covered up by the use, by the *practice* of the language-game? And that merely means: here such experiences aren't of the slightest interest to us.^b

This, of course, does not constitute an argument against the possible existence of inner objects—instead, Wittgenstein is after the *picture* which suggests the ontological distinction:

What we deny is that the picture of an inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word “remember”. Indeed, we’re saying that this picture, with its ramifications, stands in the way of our seeing the use of the word as it is.^c

Rather, the problem is that the *particular* picture of mental processes as secret, inner goings-on leads to confusion:

How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviorism arise? — The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states, and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we’ll know more about them – we think.^d

Once we have this picture of a hidden process, we go about *looking* for processes that would fit our demands. But this gets us into all sorts of trouble. And the problem was that we *insisted* on our picture of remembering as an inner process, and that picture couldn’t explain all sorts of contradictory phenomena.

... that’s just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a certain conception of what it means to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that seemed to us quite innocent.) – And now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces.^e

The analogy breaks down—it seems that remembering *can’t* be an inner process. But even though the analogy has broken down, its influence remains: if remembering *isn’t* an inner process, the philosopher wants to say, then it can’t be anything at all!

So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them.^f

The picture has fallen back a step, to the ‘yet unexplored medium’: by denying that this picture is the (single) correct one, it seems that Wittgenstein is denying the whole mental realm. But to see his point in this way is simply a further result of the entrenched picture, a further refusal to give up the ontological demand:

Here the law of the excluded middle says: it must be either like *this* or like *that*. So really – and this is surely obvious – it says nothing at all, but gives us a picture. And the problem is now supposed to be: does reality accord with the picture or not? And this picture *seems* to determine what we have to do, what to look for, and how – but it does not, precisely because we do not know how it is to be applied. Here, saying “There is no third possibility” or “there really isn’t a third possibility!” expresses our inability to turn our eyes away from this picture – a picture which looks as if it must already contain both the problem and its solution, while all the time we *feel* that it is not so.⁸

As Wittgenstein has shown, the logical boundaries implied by the picture are already blurry—and furthermore, the picture itself leads to all sorts of problems. Thus, what we have to do is give up the idea that *really* there either *are* inner processes, or *not*—the ontological distinction itself, as well as the clearly defined inner and outer objects which constitute it.

2.23 Guessing Thoughts

The skeptical problem of other minds arises from the fact that it seems as if there is an extreme difference in the epistemological status of my own and other people’s mental states: in my own case, I have *got* something—pain, a thought, an inner image, and so on—and it is impossible for me to be mistaken about this. But all I can see of other people is their behavior—and so it is possible for me to be *mistaken* about their thoughts and feelings (if, for example, they are pretending to feel differently than they actually do, or lying to me about their thoughts); the skeptic wants to say, “only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it”.^a There also seems to be a fundamental difference in how I come to know my own mental state and that of others: “If one has to imagine someone else’s pain on the model of one’s own, this is none too easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I *don’t feel* on the model of pain which I *do feel*”.^b And surely I don’t feel someone else’s pain!

We imagine that, if we could just see into someone's inner parts, we could know what they are thinking:

“While I was speaking to him, I did not know what was going on in his head.” [...] This picture should be taken seriously. We really would like to see into his head. And yet we only mean what we ordinarily mean by saying that we would like to know what he is thinking. I want to say: we have this vivid picture – and that use, apparently contradicting the picture, which expresses something mental.^c

Of course, the thoughts aren't really, *physically* ‘in his head’—we don't want to know his brain processes, we want to know his thoughts⁷¹—but the allure of the expression is there nevertheless. The question therefore becomes: if we *can* know what other people are thinking, but *not* by ‘seeing inside their heads’, how *do* we get this knowledge? Or, in more Wittgensteinian terms, when do I say that I know what's going on in her? When do I say that I *don't* know?

It is clear that for Wittgenstein, the answer is not *merely* the behaviorist's ‘from her behavior’, where that is understood as ‘just’ outward manifestations of thoughts. “If someone says, ‘How am I to know what he means – I see only his signs?’, then I say, ‘How is *he* to know what he means, he too has only his signs?’”^d Outward signs *are* important: “Can't I say: a cry, a laugh, are full of meaning? And that means, roughly: much can be gathered from them”.^e It is as if we think that knowledge of what other people are thinking must be *certain* if it is going to count at all. But cries, laughs, and so on, can still be *evidence*, even if they aren't ‘certain’ evidence. Sometimes they are evidence—but in other cases, they are features of the real, human world to which we naturally and spontaneously respond without considering evidence. The problem is related to the problem about the separated inner and outer: we are tempted to say that nothing ‘outer’ could count as evidence at all. “The idea of the intangibility of [a] mental state... is of the greatest importance. Why is it *intangible*? Isn't it because we refuse to count what is tangible about

⁷¹ “In saying this [that I did not know what was going on in his head], one is not thinking of brain processes, but of thought processes” (PI §427).

our state as part of the specific state which we are postulating?”.^f There is a natural, tangible component of many ‘mental states’—exclamations of pain, joyful laughter, the posture of the body, a facial expression, or someone’s gaze, for example. If we refuse to count these as evidence of the states they are natural manifestations of, we are simply being dogmatic.

In the *PPF*, Wittgenstein discusses a game called ‘thought guessing’:

There is a game called ‘thought guessing’. One variant of it would be this: I tell A something in a language that B does not understand. B is supposed to guess the meaning of what I say. — Another variant: I write down a sentence which the other person can’t see. He has to guess the words or the sense. — Yet another: I am putting a jigsaw puzzle together; the other person can’t see me, but from time to time guesses my thoughts and utters them. He says, for instance, “Now where is this bit?” — “Now I know how it fits!” — “I have no idea what goes in here.” — “The sky is always the hardest part”, and so on — but *I* need not be talking to myself either out loud or silently at the time.^g

At first blush, these examples of thought guessing have little to do with what we ordinarily think of when we think of guessing what someone else is thinking; however, it is important to notice that these are indeed all examples of someone having to guess what another person is thinking. Portraying the activity as a *game* foregrounds the fact that the person playing has to make use of certain kinds of evidence and rules: anything from having a large amount of evidence (seeing someone speak their thoughts, even in another language, provides a huge amount of evidence) to very little (simply knowing that someone is putting together a jigsaw puzzle). But in all of these cases, it is clear that someone could be right or wrong. And if they’re right— isn’t that an example of someone correctly figuring out what someone else is thinking?

There are even more clear-cut examples: “If I see someone writhing in pain with evident cause, I do not think: all the same, his feelings are hidden from me”.^h This example is so straightforward that we would not even say that I am *guessing*: I really *know* that the other person is in pain. This is not to say that *all* knowledge of what other people are thinking is completely

unproblematic: “one human being can be a complete enigma to another”, after all.ⁱ In terms of knowing what others are thinking, there are degrees of confidence, and it is also possible for some people to be better at understanding other people than others: “Is there such a thing as ‘expert judgment’ about the genuineness of expressions of feeling? – Here too, there are those with ‘better’ and those with ‘worse’ judgment”.^j Having such judgment is like having an eye for something:⁷²

I may recognize a genuine loving look, distinguish it from a pretended one... But I may be quite incapable of describing the difference. And this is not because the languages I know have no words for it. Why don't I simply introduce new words? — If I were a very talented painter, I might conceivably represent the genuine and the dissembled glance in pictures.^k

There remains something indefinite about the kind of knowledge gained in this way, but *not* the indefiniteness of the skeptic's radical doubt: “What is most difficult here is to express this indefiniteness correctly, and without distortion”.^l Whereas in color-vision, for example, there is usually broad agreement about what color something is (despite the existence of color-blind people), “there is in general no such agreement over the question of whether an expression of feeling is genuine or not”.^m But this is simply because some people are better, and some worse, and telling what other people are thinking; some people just have a better eye for it than others. We are left simply with our ordinary doubt, which doesn't amount to very much: “Thoughts and feelings are private” means roughly the same as “There is pretending”, or “One can hide one's thoughts and feelings; can even lie and dissimulate”.ⁿ However, *without* the dualist's ontology and logic, these ordinary doubts need not leave us in the skeptical position: there is no mysterious object to which we are denied access, so there is no possibility of *radical, generalized* doubt.

But what does someone “get an eye for”, exactly? Wittgenstein does not provide a full sketch, but rather a series of sign-posts for orienting our thinking. Clearly, one does *not* ‘look

⁷² cf. PPF xi §361.

inside' and try to apply the introspected inner experiences to others. Here, as in the discussion of sensation-words, Wittgenstein directs our attention to the experiences of *other* people, rather to our own:

The gasp of joy, laughter, jubilation, the thoughts of happiness – is not the experience of all this: joy? Do I know, then, that he is joyful because he tells me he feels his laughter, feels and hears his jubilation etc. – or because he laughs and is jubilant? Do *I* say “I am happy” because I feel all that?^o

Given the impossibility of even fixing the definition of a word by ‘looking inside’,⁷³ this should seem uncontentious. Furthermore, Wittgenstein is again focusing on a clear-cut case of *someone else*’s feelings—we are taking it for granted in this example that we know what the other is feeling. The example has *already* refocused our thinking on unproblematic cases: our perspective is being shifted to simple facts we knew already.

Thus, Wittgenstein reminds us that there are many unproblematic cases in which we have knowledge of what other people are thinking and feeling. The second major point Wittgenstein makes is, to use his term, ‘grammatical’:

I can know what someone else is thinking, not what I am thinking.
It is correct to say “I know what you are thinking”, and wrong to say “I know what I am thinking”.
(A whole cloud of philosophy condenses into a drop of grammar.)^p

This can seem mysterious and wrong: after all, it is easy to come up with uses for “I know what I am thinking”. But the point is simply that, except in unusual circumstances, we don’t wonder about what we are thinking, we just think it. On the other hand, we frequently wonder about what other people are thinking. For Wittgenstein, knowledge can exist only where there is a possibility of doubt,⁷⁴ as a point of grammar: we don’t talk about ‘knowing’ things unless we might also not

⁷³ See Malcolm’s discussion in Chapter 1.

⁷⁴ This is one of the most interesting claims made in *On Certainty*. Cf. OC §58: “If ‘I know etc.’ is conceived as a grammatical proposition, of course the “I” cannot be important. And it properly means “There is no such thing as a

know them, or be mistaken. Thus, it doesn't make sense to say, "I *know* what I am thinking, but not what someone else is", the way the skeptic wants to say.

At this point, the philosophically inclined are likely to be quite disappointed with Wittgenstein. Where is the detailed account of knowledge of other minds? Where is the explicit rebuttal of the skeptic in a detailed argument? Wittgenstein does not build an epistemic theory by marshaling arguments against the skeptic. While there are some arguments in the text, they tend to span no more than a couple of remarks. Wittgenstein is undermining the inner/outer distinction, which gives rise naturally to skepticism, by pointing out of different uses, and different possibilities, for thinking, talking and acting towards other people. By pointing out situations in which we have unqualified knowledge of the minds and feelings of others, Wittgenstein shows that total skeptical doubt is unfounded. The fact that there *are* cases in which we do not know what other people are thinking starts to look less frightening: it is simply a case of a kind of knowledge which does not attain certainty⁷⁵.

At times, Wittgenstein suggests that seeing human psychology through human behavior is like seeing an aspect; in this way, the discussion of psychology and aspect-seeing overlap. "If someone sees a smile and does not recognize it as a smile, does not understand it as such, does he see it differently from someone who understands it? – He mimics it differently, for instance".⁹ We, who are familiar with smiles, just see a smile as a smile—we are continuously seeing an aspect of that particular arrangement of facial muscles. The person who doesn't recognize a facial expression as a smile really does see it differently.

doubt in this case" or "The expression 'I do not know' makes no sense in this case". And of course it follows from this that "I know" makes no sense either".

⁷⁵ cf. "The kind of certainty is the kind of language-game" (PPF xi §352).

It should be noted that Wittgenstein is clear (*contra* some contemporary neuroscientists) that seeing an aspect, like other ‘mental processes’, is not *reducible* to physiology:

Imagine a physiological explanation of the experience. Let it be this: When we look at the figure, our eyes scan it repeatedly, always following a particular path. The path corresponds to a particular pattern of oscillation of the eyeballs in looking... and so on. Let this be the explanation. – “Yes, now I realize that it is a kind of *seeing*.”—You have now introduced a new, a physiological, criterion for seeing. And this can conceal the old problem, but not solve it.¹

Even if it is demonstrated that someone seeing the rabbit has different physiology at that moment from someone seeing the duck, that doesn’t *explain* the difference, but merely adds a new symptom or expands the definition of ‘seeing’. Aspect-seeing is not something to be explained at the level of physiology, because it is not a physiological phenomenon, but a psychological one.

Now there is a great danger that we will fall back into attributing Wittgenstein a *theory* of psychological ascriptions, for example. So, it’s important to remind ourselves that we are just making a *comparison*: seeing human behavior as behavior is in some ways like seeing a portrait as a picture of a *person*. The two things have an inexact similarity. Furthermore, some behaviors make people totally transparent—crying out in pain, for example—and others are totally mysterious (we could think of the behavior of those suffering from paranoid delusions, or thinking mathematical thoughts to oneself—there is no characteristic behavior associated with different kinds of mental math). There is no exact matching up of aspect-seeing and seeing human behavior as psychologically meaningful. Nonetheless, the comparison reveals certain *aspects* of how we play the psychological-words language game, or how we use some of our psychological words. In fact, the structure of what Wittgenstein is doing has important similarities to the ‘lighting up’ of an aspect: by offering examples of various situations, or uses of words, he gets us to see something that we had forgotten—such as the fact that we frequently know what other people are thinking—and gets us to react in a *new* way to facts that we already knew.

2.3: *Specifics of the Interpretive Position*

Now that we have seen my interpretive position in action, we can return to a more detailed discussion of its specific claims. I hope to have shown my understanding of how, for Wittgenstein, “philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything”:^a what Wittgenstein’s philosophy does is get us to *see* things in a new way. But what does this entail, if anything, and what is the point of it? We should be careful here: instead of searching for a single answer, we should realize that Wittgenstein’s texts offer multiple versions of changing one’s perspective. One of them is to resist the dogmatism created by looking for idealized generalizations:

The idea now absorbs us that the ideal ‘*must*’ occur in reality... We think the ideal must be in reality; for we think we already see it there.^b

So, for example, we saw that the person who believes in the picture of the inner and the outer might construct idealized psychological and linguistic theories that seem to justify that picture: the person who has “a certain idea of what it is to know a process better”^c goes looking for inner processes, constructs a whole psychological theory around the idea of inner processes, and even though she doesn’t know what exactly would constitute evidence for the inner/outer distinction, continues to build a theory, *convinced* that the evidence *must* be there:

The ideal, as we conceived of it, is unshakeable. You can’t step outside it. You must always turn back. There is no outside; outside you cannot breathe. – How come? The idea is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off.^d

Thus, even when Wittgenstein begins to problematize the idea of the inner process, the person consumed by the inner/outer picture cannot see anything except an advocate of behaviorism: to her, someone *must* either believe in inner processes, or be a behaviorist; *tertium non datur*. The

picture is so consuming, it never occurs to her that it could be any other way; she never questions the *picture itself*, the “pair of glasses” shaping her view of the problem.

The picture she had been consumed by was a useful one, but only in a limited way: it helped organize certain psychological phenomena, accounting, for example, for the possibility of hiding one’s true feelings. But the usefulness of the picture itself was what led to the danger: she confused a productive way of looking at things with *truth*, the *only* correct way of looking at things. In overgeneralizing the picture, she is confusing features of the picture for general facts:

One predicates of the thing what lies in the mode of representation. We take the possibility of comparison, which impresses us, as the perception of a highly general state of affairs.^e

But the picture’s overextension only leads to mysterious problems: how do other people know what I am thinking? How does the mind communicate with the body?

The person who is fascinated by the form of the proposition does the same thing: she too becomes fascinated by a particular form of expression, a particular way of looking at a proposition. When looked at from a certain angle, propositions seem to do something strikingly mysterious—to penetrate somehow through the separation between reality and representation. “Here we already have the sublimation of our whole account of logic. The tendency to assume a pure intermediary between the propositional *sign* and the facts. Or even to try to purify, to sublimate, the sign itself”.^f From one overextended analogy—a proposition is to the world as a picture is to what it depicts—a whole crystalline edifice of dogma forms. “Thought, language, now appear to us as the unique correlate, picture, of the world”:^g the question is how to understand this correlation. We must understand:

...the order existing between the concepts of proposition, word, inference, truth, experience... This order is a *super*-order between – so to speak – *super*-concepts. Whereas, in fact, if the words “language”, “experience”, “world” have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words “table”, “lamp”, “door”.^h

This analogy has led us to a certain conception of language—that it is rule-governed throughout, modeled entirely upon logical propositions that are, as they stand, in perfect order. But “the more closely we examine actual language, the greater becomes the conflict between it and our requirement... The conflict becomes intolerable”.ⁱ Language simply *isn't* always like that: many of the perfectly adequate—even indispensable—uses of language cannot be made to square with this way of looking, which has become a dogmatic requirement. What frees us is a change in how we look at things: “We see that what we call “proposition”, “language”, has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is a family of structures more or less akin to one another”.^j

For both the person who is fascinated by the inner/outer dichotomy and the person who cannot see outside of the perfectly logical ideal language, Wittgenstein provides counterexamples, challenges, and fresh objects of comparison which are meant to provide new possible ways of looking at the things which had previously seemed so puzzling. It is not that the person *necessarily* either goes back to chipping away at that exact philosophical problem or quits being a philosopher: she is armed with a new way of seeing the phenomena which troubled her, and can return to her philosophical work with fresh eyes. If this is a kind of therapy, it is more eclectic therapy⁷⁶ than psychoanalysis: Wittgenstein does not limit himself to a certain set of comparison-objects or a constrained method of dissolving problems, but makes use of real examples, hypothetical ones, traditional arguments,⁷⁷ and anything else that helps to loosen the grip of the entrenched picture. The goal is simply to make a new aspect ‘light up’: whether it is one’s quacking like a duck or

⁷⁶ Eclectic therapy is a practice in which the tools of many different theoretical approaches are used in order to produce the greatest possible benefit to the patient. Unlike in the practice of some psychoanalysts, the goal of curing the patient is allowed to take precedence over adherence to a certain method.

⁷⁷ For example, the brief argument that one cannot check a memory with another memory because it would be like checking a newspaper with another copy of the same newspaper (PI §265).

drawing a pond around the image which gets the rabbit-focused person to see the duck-aspect is unimportant.

Wittgenstein is explicit that this is his purpose in describing language-games:

Our clear and simple language-games are not preliminary studies for a future regimentation of language – as it were, first approximations, ignoring friction and air resistance. Rather, the language-games stand there as *objects of comparison* which, through similarities and dissimilarities, are meant to throw light on features of our language.^k

What does it mean for a comparison-object to throw light on a feature of our language? We need to be careful not to begin using ‘aspect’ and ‘object of comparison’ as technical terms. I want to follow Baker in giving a loose definition in terms of what the *goal* of the comparison is.⁷⁸

Objects of comparison are such in virtue of their goal, for example, to ‘light up’ a new aspect of a problem, or to allow someone to see outside the restricting bounds of an entrenched picture. What makes an object of comparison *effective* is whether it succeeds in producing this lighting-up. There are different styles of imagining possibilities, analogies, and comparison-objects: Wittgenstein himself is fond of analogies with engineering and machinery; Malcolm and many other interpreters tend to use different language-games. Fixating on one type of comparison-object when constructing a reading of Wittgenstein is again like seeing only a single aspect: since the interpretation given here hopes to be sensitive to a variety of aspects of the text, recognizing this diversity is paramount.

Aspect-seeing is also useful in helping us understand why Wittgenstein does not advocate quietism. Seeing a new aspect can certainly dissolve some philosophical problems, but always provides something else too: a new form of representation, and a clearer understanding of exactly *how* and *why* we went wrong before. The new aspect throws into relief the limitations of the

⁷⁸ (For Baker, a ‘perspicuous representation’ is simply anything which eliminates a philosophical problem).

previous aspect—the context on which it depends, the restrictions on its applicability, and its ramifications in associated aspects and pictures. Seeing that human psychology and language can be explained without reference to inner objects, for example, helps clarify that the inner/outer distinction is not a *logically necessary* one. This does *not* constitute a form of *additivity*: aspects are helping to clarify features *of other aspects*, not of an underlying concept, nor of the singular logic of our language. Both traditional and quietist readings erroneously assume that Wittgenstein wants to *excise* a troublesome form of speech and replace it with a form of speech which is assumed to be *unproblematic*. However, simply reverting to ordinary language will not protect us from philosophical problems, because the original source of many problematic pictures *is* ordinary speech; in fact, even philosophical problems must be *presented* in the vocabulary of ‘ordinary’ language: “Your very questions were framed in this language; they had to be expressed in this language, if there was anything to ask!”¹ There is not a categorically different language from the ‘philosophical’ one to which one might return once ‘Wittgensteinian therapy’ is complete: ‘ordinary’ language, when approached from particular, systematizing perspectives, naturally gives rise to philosophical problems. Enshrining either a philosophical, ‘clarified’ language *or* a faultless ‘ordinary’ language as unproblematic fails to take Wittgenstein’s point: what is problematic is *not* any particular mode of representation, but an *attitude* towards, or particular use of, that mode of representation.

Wittgenstein himself admits that it is difficult to work out how exactly a possibility’s being *imaginable* relates to its sense: “There is a lack of clarity about the role of *imaginability* in our investigation. Namely, about the extent to which it ensures that a sentence makes sense”.^m If a comparison-object is just an alternative *possibility*, and if a possibility is merely a piece of language

or linguistic picture with an ‘imaginable’ use, what is its importance? Does *imagining* a use for a piece of language make it ‘make sense’?

The frame of aspect-seeing is again helpful. *Imagining* a new way of using a picture—a new way of seeing the picture—does not guarantee that this new aspect is useful, productive, or that it ‘makes sense’, if we (simplistically) think of its ‘making sense’ as its having a use. Nonetheless, demonstrating a new possibility can be a corrective against the idea that one way of seeing is *necessary*. There is philosophical work done by the imagining of a new possibility. Demonstrating a possibility is *not* like demonstrating a metaphysical truth. In particular, it does not undermine any other possibility. But it *does* prevent us from taking any possibility to be a necessary truth.

There is a radical reconception of philosophy inherent in Wittgenstein’s writings which the frame of aspect-seeing can help us understand. But it is *not* the transition from philosophy to grammar, although understanding language is at the heart of the approach: “Philosophy is not a description of language usage”, Wittgenstein writes in the *RPP*; “and yet one can learn it by constantly attending to all the expressions of life in the language”.ⁿ It is not *wrong* to say that Wittgenstein is describing grammar (he is frequently doing this), and it is also not *wrong* to say that Wittgenstein is analyzing concepts. I just don’t want to say Wittgenstein is *only* doing one or the other of these things. We also have to be clear about *why* he is doing this, when he is doing so. The focus is being imperceptibly shifted from the conceptual object to its *mode of representation*; from the concept to its aspects. The investigation therefore often focuses on modes of representation, and comparison-objects frequently either are or lead to new ways of looking at or representing things. The duck-rabbit is not three separate objects: a duck-drawing, a rabbit-drawing, and a duck-rabbit-drawing. It is one drawing which can be seen in three different ways.

The change here is in the object of our attention: not words, concepts, philosophy, etc. but operations with words, representations of concepts, and so on. This transition emerges from the abandonment of seeking for a *definitive* representation, and *should not* be taken to be a metaphysical claim such as ‘there are only representations’. It is simply a matter of what Wittgenstein is frequently concerned with.

In the case of other-minds skepticism, we can see that Wittgenstein is interested in *how we represent* inner states, people, other minds, and so on; he is interested in our ‘pictures’ of these concepts, situations, and problem. We can (and must) still use the same pictures we did before, but with a better understanding of their use and implications.

In what sense, then, are philosophical problems *logical* problems? It is important to Wittgenstein’s work that this is the case: “Merely recognizing the philosophical problem as a logical one is progress. The proper attitude and the method accompany it”.^o Wittgenstein is interested in our ways of *representing* concepts. Frequently, he uses the word ‘logic’ to refer to the ways concepts, and groups of concepts, behave, as when he speaks of “the logic of our language”.^p There are two points to make here. First, this does not mean that Wittgenstein has a theory of language. Wittgenstein does not think that there could ever be a complete accounting of language such that it would constitute a theory. Furthermore, all theories are models which involve idealization or selective representations in an attempt to get at ‘how things are’. Wittgenstein, however, wants no fixed representation, rigid structure, idealization—not even a fairly flexible and permissive theory: “logic does not treat of language – or of thought – in the sense in which a natural science treats of a natural phenomenon, and the most that can be said is that we *construct* ideal languages”.^q His view of language is dynamic, and requires perspectives, comparison-objects, models, and structures which can be used and replaced as needed. For example, in reacting *against*

proposed theories of language, such as the Augustinian picture of words-as-names discussed at the beginning of the *PI*,⁷⁹ Wittgenstein employs a variety of other uses of language, both real and imagined, in loosening the hold of that aspect-conception of language. But here the comparison to aspect-seeing needs to be applied very carefully. There is not one ‘superstructure’ of logic which explains all of language; we might say, there is not only one logic of language. Pictures, words, and concepts are highly ramified⁸⁰, and there is not a single ‘order’ of concepts.[†]

The second question emerges from the first. In what sense are philosophical problems ‘logical’ if there is not *one* logic? Well, for example, the problem of inner processes was a logical one because it dealt with the correct application of a picture of a concept, a picture which had branches spread through a whole sphere of language. A *solution* of the problem is not a “logico-mathematical discovery”,[§] not an *inference* or conclusion, but rather seeing “into the workings of our language”.[†] Playing aspects off of each other allows us to see the relevant features of each—the “workings of our language” therefore remain at the level of aspects, but they are still representations of language. Philosophical problems are therefore logical *because* they deal with our modes of expression—with our language. Pictures or aspects, as represented, have features we might think of as logical—general practices for their use, organizational principles, and so on—and philosophy is ‘logical’ in virtue of dealing with these kinds of features. We can therefore understand the use of the word ‘logical’ as pointing us, again, towards the particular forms Wittgenstein is concerned with.

⁷⁹ The opening section of the book, which deals with this ‘Augustinian picture of language’, is the original of the famous dictum “meaning is use”. Wittgenstein opens the *Investigations* with a paragraph from Augustine which expresses the idea that all words are, essentially, *names*, and then gives a wide range of examples which cannot be made to square with this account of language. Because his discussion frequently urges the reader to look at “the functions of language” (PI §10), Wittgenstein has been attributed the ‘theory’ that a word’s meaning is given by its use. Unfortunately, I do not have space to discuss this claim here in detail, but my overall reading should make it clear why I see such attributions as mistaken.

⁸⁰ cf. PI §305.

The last thing to clarify is what I mean by a picture ‘embedded in a mode of expression’. In our example of the picture of the inner and the outer, there were countless examples of modes of expression which contained this picture:

“While I was speaking to him, I did not know what was going on in his head.” In saying this, one is not thinking of brain processes, but of thought processes. This picture should be taken seriously. We really would like to see into his head. And yet we only mean what we ordinarily mean by saying that we would like to know what he is thinking.^u

Both ‘ordinary’ and ‘philosophical’ language contain countless idiomatic, analogical, or otherwise potentially misleading expressions which convey or suggest the pictures which Wittgenstein is concerned with. These ‘modes of expression’ are like a ‘frame’ through which we look at things, “like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at”.^v

These new possibilities do not permanently *replace* the original picture or aspect. Once a new aspect lights up, one sees that one was mistaken in assuming that the older picture *must* structure one’s thinking or be the basis of theorizing; the dualist sees, for example, that she *need not* base her thinking about human psychology, self-knowledge, and knowledge of others on the picture of the inner and the outer. Nonetheless, the original picture maintains its limited usefulness: the new possibility does not *foreclose* any others. Wittgenstein’s goal is not the scientific goal of replacing an outdated theory with a newer, more accurate one, but is rather to produce an enriched set of possible ways of seeing, which will allow for greater clarity in particular situations. Thus the person who is taught a new aspect does *not* have to give up the old way of seeing: he is free to use it, as long as it is used properly and is clearly understood as being *one* way of seeing. “The picture is there, and I do not dispute its *correctness*. But *what* is its application?”.^w Because Wittgenstein does not wish to *interfere* with the ordinary use of language,^x he will not make anyone give up any of the pictures lying immanent in language—he just wants to make their use be

understood clearly. Once the picture is understood as an *aspect*, its danger is nullified—it no longer seems to have metaphysical implications.

One can describe, organize, or offer a comparison in order to get someone to see a new aspect: “This triangle can be seen as a triangular hole, a solid, as a geometrical drawing; as standing on its base, as hanging from its apex...”^y The comparison with aspect-seeing reveals the *expressive* and *organizational* possibilities of these revealed aspects. Wittgenstein often uses *musical* metaphors to illustrate the fact that a multiplicity of interpretive possibilities can be contained in a single expression: “The reinterpretation of a facial expression can be compared to the reinterpretation of a chord in music, when we hear it as a modulation first into this, then into that, key”.^z Seeing the same ‘sign’ (or musical expression) in a different context can ‘light up’ different possibilities, different aspects.⁸¹

Enumerating any number of aspects does not constitute a ‘complete’ understanding of that object. This is, I believe, both the correct understanding of aspect-seeing and of Wittgenstein’s method. Here the duck-rabbit analogy has reached the limit of its use: because it is specifically *designed* to have two (and probably no more than two) aspects, it makes our case seem too simple. But in the case of human gender, for example, we can see that there are possible modes of representation which allow us to see past the limiting binary of male/female: if, for example, we recognize the possibility of seeing gender identity as a way of self-identifying, we separate gender and sex; if we recognize the possibility of fluidity in gender-identity, or of thinking in terms of a spectrum rather than a binary, we can resist the broad theories suggested by the dominance of the binary aspect. All of these aspects have *different* uses, and are locally exclusive: it causes only

⁸¹ In this analogy, the modulations are like comparison-objects: they show different possible uses of the chord, standing in for a word, phrase, expression, or sign.

confusion to say that gender is *both* a binary and a spectrum. One cannot have a *definitive* aspect, only an aspect-for-a-purpose.⁸² When someone proposes a new way of seeing, we cannot say that this is *wrong*, merely that our previous set of rules did not foresee this possibility: “‘This law was not given with such cases in view.’ Does that mean it is senseless?”^{aa} The previous rules (or law) simply *don’t* give an answer either way about this use—they were not constructed with this case in view. There can be neither a definitive list of aspects, nor a definitive list of possibilities; our form of life, our laws and purposes, all of which may result in new possibilities, evolve and change.

In this spirit, aspects should not be understood as ‘properties’ of a single object which they are aspects of. An aspect is not, as Kuusela suggests by describing what is learned as ‘logical’, something *inhering* in the grammar: it is the possibility of a concept looking different in different surroundings:

A coronation is the picture of pomp and dignity. Cut one minute of this proceeding out of its surroundings: the crown is being placed on the head of the king in his coronation robes. – But in different surroundings, gold is the cheapest of metals, its gleam thought vulgar. There the fabric of the robe is cheap to produce. A crown is a parody of a respectable hat. And so on.^{bb}

What we want to *avoid* doing is enshrining these possibilities as getting at something ‘deep’. Aspects are not *in* the thing; they are “half... experience, half thought”,^{cc} “‘The echo of a thought in sight’”.^{dd} They emerge as if by the alchemical combination of object, comparison-object, and attitude—sometimes in a flash. In another way, they are embodied in attitudes and practices, or found in “the mythology in the forms of our language”:^{ee} ways of speaking that have developed historically and become an unconscious part of how we use words. By enriching our set of aspects,

⁸² I have specifically chosen this example to demonstrate that aspects can have ramifications in our real, lived forms of life. There are implications for our moral practice which can grow from the kind of dogmatism against which Wittgenstein’s philosophy sets itself. And we can see that, in some cases, the better clarity gained by understanding the limitedness of particular aspects can have real consequences: the feeling of many people, for example, that they are not justly represented by particular ways of seeing—and therefore treating—gender identity. I am not here *advancing* a moral point about this, but merely highlighting an interesting connection. I offer also the suggestive comment by Wittgenstein: “to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life” (*PI* §19).

we are not adding to a list of features which will give us a complete view of a concept: we are adding new modes of representation and ways of seeing.

Thus, what we learn is that we *can* look at things a different way. What exactly the demonstration of this possibility teaches us—besides dislodging what seemed like the *only* possibility—is difficult to state. Wittgenstein himself recognizes this difficulty:

What does it mean to understand a picture, a drawing? Here too there is understanding and not understanding. And here too these expressions may mean various kinds of thing. The picture is, say, a still-life; but I don't understand one part of it: I cannot see solid objects there, but only patches of colour on the canvas. – Or I see all the objects, but I am not familiar with them... Perhaps, however, I know the objects, but, in another sense, do not understand the way they are arranged.^{ff}

The “lighting up of an aspect” can show us one possibility as to why things are *arranged* the way they are, even when this is something internal to the way of looking that produces *that* aspect. “‘A picture tells me itself’ is what I’d like to say. That is, its telling me something consists in its own structure, in *its* own forms and colours”.^{gg} What this can show us is that what seemed before like a jumble was produced by using the *wrong* frame, by emphasizing the *wrong* features of something. We may not understand why a Mondrian has just the arrangement of colors that it does until we understand color theory and how to formally analyze a painting; thereafter, we can see that “Composition II” places a yellow rectangle in the lower right-hand corner to resist the otherwise regimented composition, creating interesting visual tension. It is not the case that *any* interpretation goes—there is still “understanding and not understanding”. Some ways of looking at something ‘light up’ aspects, and some don’t—concepts are at home in some environments and not in others. “It is not every sentence-like formation that we know how to do something with, not every technique that has a use in our life”.^{hh}

2.4: A Deflationary Metaphilosophy

At this point, we can turn our criticism on something which might, until now, have seemed unquestionable: the very idea of Wittgenstein's having a unified metaphilosophy. A "metaphilosophy", for our purposes, is a unified approach to or perspective on philosophy: a 'philosophy of philosophy', we might say. Metaphilosophy can be thought of as 'second-order' philosophy: it is concerned with the methods and limits of philosophy, and therefore takes philosophy as its subject matter. Thus interpreters, in looking for Wittgenstein's method, can be thought of as looking for a metaphilosophical position: a singular approach to philosophy which connects every philosophical move Wittgenstein makes.

Every interpreter we have discussed has therefore assumed that Wittgenstein has a unified metaphilosophy. Some interpreters, particularly the quietist ones, *begin* their work by assuming that Wittgenstein has a strong metaphilosophical position, and then searching for evidence which will confirm this assumption. Every one of the interpreters we have discussed offers a single, unique statement to fill in the phrase: "Wittgenstein sees philosophy as...".⁸³ So, the traditional interpreters say: "Wittgenstein sees philosophy as a set of arguments for theories"; the quietists say: "Wittgenstein sees philosophy as a method for demonstrating that philosophy is nonsense"; and Baker and Kuusela say: "Wittgenstein sees philosophy as a therapeutic method for dissolving philosophical problems caused by dogmatism".⁸⁴

Moreover, for most post-traditional interpreters, Wittgenstein's philosophy *is*, precisely, his metaphilosophy. In their view, Wittgenstein's entire approach to philosophy results from a metaphilosophical view: that philosophy is dangerous nonsense produced by unconscious pictures,

⁸³ I am not saying that it is *impossible* to fill in this sentence; however, I *am* saying that one filling-in of this sentence *cannot* be definitive.

⁸⁴ In their different ways, of course. See the discussion of their individual views.

for example. Wittgenstein's philosophical method then follows directly from this metaphilosophical position: he develops a set of techniques designed to uproot these pictures. These methods are guaranteed to work every time, because philosophical problems are all generated the same way, as if their source lay in some difficult to discover ur-picture.

At first glance, many things that Wittgenstein says about philosophy seem to support such a view. For example, Wittgenstein writes, "Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language";^a "What we do is bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use";^b "The results of philosophy are the discovery of some piece of plain nonsense and the bumps that understanding has got by running up against the limits of language".^c However, as I have argued in previous chapters, neither traditional, quietist, nor therapeutic interpretations seem to be able to give a definitive description of Wittgenstein's philosophy; each ends up as a restrictive, dogmatic view which cannot account for the variety of approaches present in Wittgenstein's texts. They therefore become blind to aspects of the text which do not square well with their favored interpretation.

So far, we have held up each of these metaphilosophical possibilities as a comparison-object for Wittgenstein's philosophy: and each of them, in its own way, reduced the complexity of Wittgenstein's thought; each ultimately lapsed into a dogmatic, inflexible view of what the text offers. This is because each of these metaphilosophical views performs, 'one level up', the same restriction of possibilities Wittgenstein is constantly opposing.

However, Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the possibility of a 'second-order' philosophy:

One might think: if philosophy speaks of the use of the word "philosophy", there must be a second-order philosophy. But that's not the way it is; it is, rather, like the case of orthography, which deals with the word "orthography" among others without then being second-order.^d

Much as Wittgenstein constantly denies the possibility of rigid, exhaustive descriptions of ‘the logic of our language’, or the grammar of particular words and concepts, which seek to abstract from and systematize—that is, codify into second-order rules—the diversity of phenomena, he here denies the possibility of a ‘second-order’ philosophy, a definition or set of rules which would clearly delineate the boundaries of philosophy. ‘Philosophy’, like any other word Wittgenstein treats, is a word which is used in more than one way: offering a ‘second-order philosophy’ would be a way of *defining* ‘philosophy’, of providing clear rules for its use, but would, like any suggestion for redefining the use of a word, really constitute a *new* use of the word. To get a clear view of philosophy, we must not specify its content in advance.

The view I am endorsing might be called a ‘deflationary’ view of Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy.⁸⁵ It might be stated like this: Wittgenstein, in his texts, undertakes certain investigative tasks. In doing so, he employs certain philosophical *tools*: tools designed to aid in the investigation. These sometimes include: examples of language-games, comparison-objects of various kinds, ‘perspicuous representations’, dialogues with an interlocutor, and so on. What unites these tools? The fact that they are used by the philosopher. Why does the philosopher use them? To accomplish whatever the aim of the investigation is. Early in the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein opposes a definition of tools in terms of necessary and sufficient properties:

“The tools in a toolbox: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screw. – The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects.” [...] “Suppose someone said, ‘*All* tools serve to modify something. So, a hammer modifies the position of a nail, a saw the shape of a board, and so on.’ – And what is modified by a rule, a glue-pot and nails? – ‘Our knowledge of a thing’s length, the temperature of the glue, and the solidity of a box.’ — Would anything be gained by this assimilation of expressions?”^e

⁸⁵ Not: a deflationary (or quietist) view of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

Tools have diverse functions, and therefore the effort to state a single function in virtue of which all tools are tools is doomed to failure. Just as there are similarities, and also differences, between different tools, so there are similarities, but also differences, in Wittgenstein's practice of philosophy in different contexts.

In fact, it makes perfect sense that Wittgenstein should be thought of as having no metaphilosophy: no single metaphilosophical approach could create a philosophy flexible enough to accommodate the variety of philosophical problems Wittgenstein engages with. Ironically, it is the need for *precision* which can be thought of as driving this flexibility: to generalize is frequently to misrepresent, and therefore to make a mistake. To achieve real clarity, the philosopher must *react* to the content of the problem facing her. In contrast, a metaphilosophy, we might say, *anticipates*: by dictating an approach to philosophy, it dictates its future approach to any subject matter, and therefore is incapable of responding to the diversity of philosophical problems. The view that every philosophical problem stems from an unconscious picture, for example, dictates that the philosopher, in every situation, searches for an unconscious picture. What then is the philosopher to do with an interlocutor who has a *totally conscious* picture, as is true in the case of the skeptic? Instead, Wittgenstein's philosophical practice *reacts*: instead of recycling systematized approaches, he deals with the problems on their own terms.

Baker might say: this is one virtue of the therapeutic view. Just as the analyst delivers a personalized treatment for each patient, the philosopher can offer a personalized treatment for every suffering philosopher, a treatment which reacts to the particular problem they are presenting. However, this response would *still* have a metaphilosophical assumption: every patient's problem must be made *to go away*, and the picture they come in with must be dislodged. This is belied by

the instances—for example the case of the inner/outer distinction—in which Wittgenstein seems perfectly happy to leave certain pictures in place, so long as they are not used improperly.

Wittgenstein's philosophical tools, like hammers, pliers, saws, and so on, only make sense in their appropriate context: there is no way of abstracting from each of their uses to a *rule* for their use. Different philosophical problems may require different approaches: the exact same tools which worked in the case of Augustine's conception of language will not work for the picture of the mind as a secret realm. The *attitude* towards the philosophical problem is what is constant: each problem is taken seriously, as something to be puzzled through, fully understood, and not to be dismissed. Wittgenstein is interested in the causes of the philosophical problems, whether they be "entanglement in our rules",^f not knowing our way about,^g forgetting things,^h not seeing possibilities which are right before our eyes,ⁱ or whatever else they may be. The understanding which he is seeking is likely to be deep, sometimes extending even past the 'grammatical' errors in question to the *causes* of these errors: forms of life, practices, ways of seeing and so on. But in no case can the content and method of the analysis be specified in advance, nor can all of the diverse possibilities be subsumed under a single metaphilosophical theory.

Now an opponent wants to say: if there cannot be a summing-up of Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy in the form of a metaphilosophical theory, then we cannot say *anything* about his approach—there is no interpretation to be had. To see that this is not the case, recall the dilemma about giving a definition of a word: someone wants to say, unless you can give me a clear, exact definition of a word, you don't know what it means. But this isn't the case: the application of a word "is not everywhere bounded by rules",^j and yet words function nonetheless: there are not "any rules for how high one may throw the ball in tennis, or how hard, yet tennis is a game for all that".^k All that we are giving up is the idea that an ordering or accounting of

Wittgenstein's philosophy can be *definitive*: an order can be made, but it is a limited order-for-a-purpose, just as an ordering of concepts or words is an order-for-a-purpose.

What then is the status of an interpretation, for example, my interpretation? I offer that it is a possible way of seeing the text. That formulation may appear to be too permissive, but it is not: the text firmly *resists* certain interpretations, and plays well with others. An interpretation will be a good one if it productively draws our attention to an aspect of the text, and does *not* lapse into dogmatism. This defines a good interpretation largely negatively, but leaves room for the interpretation to *do* something. In that way, my interpretation is *not* a traditional interpretation, *not* a quietist interpretation, *not* an interpretation which seeks completeness. However, seeing the interpretation as of limited utility does not mean attributing *zero* utility to it. The proof of its utility will be found in its getting us to see an aspect of Wittgenstein's thought.

This is one reason why I have been careful to present my interpretation as a *possibility*, an ordering-for-a-purpose.⁸⁶ Aspect-seeing, when used as a comparison-object, provides us with an ordering principle that allows us to see a particular feature of Wittgenstein's philosophy (not: his metaphilosophy): that it may be used to show us possibilities we had previously overlooked. This is a limited and cautious claim, though even such a careful statement faces the risk of misinterpretation at every step. But I hope that stating my interpretive claim in this way avoids both horns of the metaphilosophical dilemma: that it succeeds in saying *something* about Wittgenstein's philosophy *without* claiming, or imposing, a regimented structure.

⁸⁶ Cf. *PI* §132.

ENDNOTES

Introduction

^a*PI* 4.

Section 0.2

^a *PI* xxi.

Section 1.1

^a Malcolm 46

^b Malcolm 46

^c *PI* §243

^d Malcolm 46

^e *PI* §§293, 295

^f *PI* §303

^g *PI* §253

^h *PI* §263

ⁱ *PI* §289; Malcolm 47

^j Malcolm 48

^k Malcolm 48

^l *PI* §258

^m Malcolm 48

ⁿ *PI* §215

^o Malcolm 55

^p Malcolm 56

^q *PI* §244; Malcolm 57

^r Malcolm 60

^s Malcolm 60

^t Malcolm 63

^u *PPF* xi §330

^v Malcolm 70

Section 1.11

^a Chihara and Fodor 174

^b Chihara and Fodor 174

^c *PPF* xi §338

^d Chihara and Fodor 175

^e Chihara and Fodor 175

^f Chihara and Fodor 175

^g Chihara and Fodor 176

^h Chihara and Fodor 179

ⁱ *PI* §580

^j Chihara and Fodor 183

^k Chihara and Fodor 184

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- ^l Chihara and Fodor 185
 - ^m Chihara and Fodor 185
 - ⁿ Chihara and Fodor 186
 - ^o Chihara and Fodor 189
 - ^p Chihara and Fodor 191
 - ^q Chihara and Fodor 193
 - ^r Chihara and Fodor 196
 - ^s Chihara and Fodor 200
 - ^t *PI* §128
 - ^u *PI* §126

Section 1.12

- ^a *PI* §307
- ^b *PI* §306
- ^c *PI* §306
- ^d *PPF* xi §306
- ^e *PI* §352
- ^f Malcolm 70
- ^g *PI* §122
- ^h *PI* §122
- ⁱ *PI* §97
- ^j *PI* §107
- ^k *PI* §133
- ^l *PI* §132

Section 1.31

- ^a Baker 116
- ^b Baker 118
- ^c Baker 128
- ^d Baker 128
- ^e Baker 128
- ^f Baker 128
- ^g This duck-rabbit is from <http://www.utm.edu/research/iep-wp/wp-content/media/duck-rabbit.jpg>
- ^h *PPF* xi §118
- ⁱ Baker 279
- ^j Baker 279
- ^k Baker 280
- ^l Baker 282

Section 1.32

- ^a Baker 179
- ^b *HISP* 32
- ^c Baker 145

-
- ^d *HISP* 1
 - ^e Baker 149
 - ^f Baker 155
 - ^g Baker 301
 - ^h *BT* §410
 - ⁱ *BT* §406
 - ^j Hacker 7
 - ^k *LC* 44
 - ^l *LC* 48
 - ^m Baker 151
 - ⁿ *Z* §456
 - ^o Baker 213
 - ^p Baker 187
 - ^q Baker 208
 - ^r Baker 208
 - ^s *PI* §352
 - ^t Baker 280
 - ^u Baker 217
 - ^v Baker 157
 - ^w *PI* §115
 - ^x Baker 215
 - ^y Baker 281
 - ^z Baker 284
 - ^{aa} Baker 291
 - ^{bb} Baker 8
 - ^{cc} TS 220 §99
 - ^{dd} *PI* §133
 - ^{ee} *PI* §133
 - ^{ff} *PI* §133

Section 1.4

- ^a Kuusela 128
- ^b Kuusela 2
- ^c Kuusela 3
- ^d Kuusela 27
- ^e Kuusela 136
- ^f Kuusela 142
- ^g Kuusela 124
- ^h Kuusela 44
- ⁱ Kuusela 39
- ^j Kuusela 45
- ^k Kuusela 89
- ^l Kuusela 89
- ^m Kuusela 136

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- ⁿ Kuusela 141
 - ^o MS 140 77
 - ^p *PI* §371
 - ^q Kuusela 212
 - ^r *PI* §76
 - ^s Kuusela 143
 - ^t Kuusela 123
 - ^u Kuusela 103-4
 - ^v Kuusela 137
 - ^w Kuusela 166
 - ^x Kuusela 86
 - ^y Kuusela 148
 - ^z *PI* §132

Section 2.1

- ^a *PPF* xi §130
- ^b *PPF* xi §127
- ^c *PPF* xi §130
- ^d *PPF* xi §137
- ^e *PPF* xi §162
- ^f *PPF* xi §167
- ^g *PPF* xi §199
- ^h *PI* §93
- ⁱ *PI* §134
- ^j *PI* §94
- ^k *PI* §129
- ^l *PPF* xi §127

Section 2.2

- ^a *PI* §294
- ^b *PI* §272
- ^c E.g. *PI* §286

Section 2.21

- ^a *PI* §364
- ^b *PPF* xi §305
- ^c *PI* §244
- ^d *PI* §421
- ^e *PI* §149

Section 2.22

- ^a *PPF* v §30
- ^b *RPP* I §184
- ^c *PI* §305

^d *PI* §308

^e *PI* §308

^f *PI* §308

^g *PI* §352

Section 2.23

^a *PI* §246

^b *PI* §302

^c *PI* §427

^d *PI* §504

^e *PI* §543

^f *PI* §608

^g *PPF* xi §321

^h *PPF* xi §324

ⁱ *PPF* xi §325

^j *PPF* xi §355

^k *PPF* xi §360

^l *PPF* xi §356

^m *PPF* xi §352

ⁿ *RPP* v1 §570

^o *RPP* v1 §449

^p *PPF* xi §315

^q *PPF* xi §149

^r *PPF* xi §236

Section 2.3

^a *PI* §126

^b *PI* §101

^c *PI* §308

^d *PI* §103

^e *PI* §§101, 103-4

^f *PI* §94

^g *PI* §96

^h *PI* §97

ⁱ *PI* §107

^j *PI* §108

^k *PI* §130

^l *PI* §120

^m *PI* §395

ⁿ *RPP* I §121

^o *LWPP* I, §256

^p *PI* §93

^q *PI* §81

^r *PI* §132

^s *PI* §125
^t *PI* §109
^u *PI* §427
^v *PI* §103
^w *PI* §424
^x *PI* §124
^y *PPF* xi §162
^z *PI* §536
^{aa} *RPP* II §332
^{bb} *PI* §584
^{cc} *PPF* xi §140
^{dd} *PPF* xi §235
^{ee} *PO* 197
^{ff} *PI* §526
^{gg} *PI* §523
^{hh} *PI* §520

Section 2.4

^a *PI* §109
^b *PI* §116
^c *PI* §119
^d *PI* §121
^e *PI* §§11, 14
^f *PI* §125
^g *PI* §123
^h *PI* §127
ⁱ *PI* §129
^j *PI* §84
^k *PI* §68

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